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"I never can be thankful, Mr. Bennet, for any thing about the entail."t
Perpetual trusts are an established feature of today's estate planning
firmament. Yet little-noticed provisions in the constitutions of nine states,
including in five states that purport to allow perpetual trusts by statute,
proscribe ')erpetuities." This Article examines those provisions in light of the
meaning of ')erpetuity" as a legal term of art across history. We consider the
constitutionality of perpetual trust statutes in states that have a constitutional
ban on perpetuities and whether courts in states with such a ban may give effect
to a perpetual trust settled in another state. Because text, purpose, and history
all suggest hat the constitutional perpetuities bans were meant to proscribe
entails, whether in form or in function, and because a perpetual trust is in
purpose and in function an entail, we conclude that recognition of perpetual
trusts is prohibited in states with a constitutional perpetuities ban.
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The organizing principle of American succession law is freedom
of disposition.1 American law embraces freedom of disposition, enabling
dead hand control, to a degree that is unique among modern legal
systems.2 But even within the permissive American tradition, freedom
of disposition has never been absolute. American law protects a donor's
spouse and creditors, allows for the imposition of transfer taxes, and
imposes a handful of anti-dead hand public policy constraints, the most
venerable of which is the Rule Against Perpetuities (the "Rule"). 3 By
requiring that all interests vest or fail within lives in being at the
creation of the interest plus twenty-one years, the Rule puts a limit on
trust duration of roughly one hundred years.4
In recent years, however, a movement arose to repeal the Rule.
Spurred on by a change to the federal tax code in 1986 that gave
salience to long-term trusts in estate planning, lawyers and bankers
have lobbied successfully for legislation in a majority of states to
authorize perpetual (or effectively perpetual) trusts.5 The effect on
practice has been profound. An empirical study, coauthored by one of
us, found that through 2003, states that had repealed the Rule
collectively experienced $100 billion more growth in their trust
businesses than states that had retained the Rule.6 Because this finding
is based on data that is now ten years out of date, and because it reflects
only trust funds held by trustees that are federally regulated banking
institutions, it understates the effect of validating perpetual trusts in
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014).
2. Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643-44; see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE
RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6-7 (2010) (comparing American law with foreign forced
succession and family maintenance systems).
3. Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 644, 666.
4. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 880-82 (9th
ed. 2013) (explaining that "the Rule puts an outer boundary of roughly 100 years or so on the
temporal reach of the dead hand").
5. See JEFFREY A SCHOENBLUM, 2013 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING tbl.9 (2012)
(collecting state perpetuities laws); infra Figure 1. For the basic story and the role of the tax code,
see, for example, Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 1303, 1304-17 (2003); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?,
40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291, 1291-306 (2013); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities
or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2472-81 (2006);
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for
the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2101-05 (2003); and Angela M. Vallario, Death by a
Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141, 145-53 (1999).
6. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds:
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410-11 (2005).
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current practice.7 Perpetual trusts are today an established feature of
the estate planning firmament.8
Yet little-noticed provisions in the constitutions of nine states,
including in five that purport to allow perpetual (or effectively
perpetual) trusts, proscribe "perpetuities."9 The North Carolina
provision, which dates back to 1776, is illustrative: "Perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be
allowed."10 Is a statute that authorizes perpetual (or effectively
perpetual) trusts constitutional in a state with such a provision? Should
a court in a state with such a provision give effect to another state's
perpetual trust statute?
Answering these questions, which is the project of this Article,
requires an understanding of the meaning of "perpetuity" as that term
is used in the state constitutions. 11 The North Carolina provision, which
was the template for most of the others, predates John Chipman Gray's
canonical 1886 statement of the common law Rule by more than a
7. Id. at 411. Indeed, at year-end 2013, South Dakota trust companies alone held $148
billion in trust assets. Email from Bret Afdahal, Dir., S.D. Div. of Banking, to author (Aug. 26,
2014, 5:32 PM) (on file with authors). South Dakota was a leader in the movement to validate
perpetual trusts. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 391-95.
8. The practitioner literature is replete with articles touting the advantages of settling a
perpetual trust in one state or another. See, e.g., Daniel G. Worthington, Perpetual Trust States-
The Latest Rankings, TR. & EST., Jan. 2014, at 53; Daniel G. Worthington & Mark Merric, Which
Situs is Best in 2014?, TR. & EST., Jan. 2007, at 59. Media coverage is also common. See, e.g., John
Koten, You're Dead, But Still in Control, WALL ST. J. MAG., Mar. 8, 2013, at 32 (noting lobbying
toward perpetual trusts).
9. Although the perpetuities literature is abundant, very little of it addresses these
constitutional provisions. The main exceptions are William E. Burby, The Meaning of the
California Constitutional Provision Prohibiting Perpetuities, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 107-15 (1928);
Lynn Foster, Fifty-One Flowers: Post-Perpetuities War Law and Arkansas's Adoption of USRAP,
29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 411, 443-49 (2007); Robert H. Gerdes, "Perpetuities" and the
California Rule Against Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 81, 92-
96 (1928); John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities in North Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399, 399-
411 (2009).
10. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 1970 amendments). This text varies
slightly from the version enacted in 1776. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art.
XXIII ("That perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not
to be allowed.").
11. Scholars have become increasingly interested in state constitutional law, both for its own
sake, see, for example, RANDY J. HOLLAND ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN
EXPERIENCE 1-5 (2010); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS 1-4 (2013); and Jeffrey S. Sutton,
Courts As Change Agents: Do We Want More-or Less?, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1428-41 (2014),
and for how it might inform our understanding of the federal Constitution, see, for example,
SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICAS 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE
(2012). See also JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL M. NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 90-
91 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing North Carolina's constitutional prohibition of "perpetuities").
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century. 12 It is not immediately obvious, therefore, how to translate the
rhetoric of "perpetuity," as used in founding-era state constitutions, into
a doctrinal limit on government power to authorize perpetual trusts.
The cases are scarce and contradictory. 13
Given the "real and intense" competition among the states for
trust business, 1 4 the potential for these constitutional provisions to
disrupt perpetual trust practice is of significant import. Nevada, which
has been aggressive in its pursuit of trust business, 15 provides an
interesting case study. In 2002, proponents of perpetual trusts in that
state recognized that the state constitution was a roadblock. So they
sponsored a referendum to repeal the state's constitutional perpetuities
provision. To their surprise,16 the referendum was rejected by a margin
of sixty percent to forty percent. 17 Nevertheless, in the teeth of this vote,
the legislature passed a bill permitting trusts to endure for 365 years.1 8
Is this legislation consistent with the state's constitutional
commitment, reaffirmed in 2002, to prohibiting perpetuities?
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II
provides context by reviewing the rise and fall of the Rule Against
Perpetuities and the meaning of "perpetuity" as a legal term of art
across history. Part III surveys the state constitutional provisions on
perpetuities, tracing them back to the 1776 Constitution of North
Carolina. Part IV considers the constitutional prohibitions of
"perpetuities" in light of their historical context, including the
contemporaneous policy rhetoric and common law. Part V considers
whether recognition of perpetual trusts is prohibited in states with a
constitutional prohibition of perpetuities. We conclude that legislation
12. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed.,
4th ed. 1942).
13. The key cases are addressed infra in Part V.A and V.B.2.
14. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 412.
15. See Worthington & Merric, supra note 8 (observing that Nevada has no fiduciary income
tax and regularly updates its trust laws). Nevada is, for example, a preferred jurisdiction for
private trust companies. See Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust
Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 467, 474-75 (2010) (discussing
Nevada's private trust company laws); Alan V. Ytterberg & James P. Weller, Managing Family
Wealth Through a Private Trust Company, 36 ACTEC L.J. 623, 625 (2010) (same).
16. Prior to the vote, the sponsors wrote of the amendment's "expected voter approval."
Steven J. Oshins & Judith K. Ruud, Dynasty Trusts in Nevada: Countdown to 12/01/02, NEV.
LAW., Oct. 2001, at 18.
17. Election 2002, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Nov. 8, 2002, at 3C.
18. NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.1031(1)(b) (West 2013). There have also been efforts, thus far
unsuccessful, to repeal the constitutional ban on perpetuities in North Carolina and in Texas. See
Act of Mar. 23, 2011, 2011 N.C. S.B. 398, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (North
Carolina); Ashley Vaughan, You Can't Take It with You: Property Rights After Death and
Rethinking the Rule Against Perpetuities, 47 S. TEx. L. REV. 615, 637-39 (2006) (Texas).
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authorizing perpetual or long-enduring dynasty trusts is
constitutionally suspect in a state with a constitutional prohibition, but
more modest reforms that approximate the common law Rule are
permissible. We also suggest hat the constitutional prohibitions reflect
the kind of strong public policy that would authorize a court in a state
with such a provision to refuse to apply another state's law authorizing
perpetual trusts. A short conclusion follows.
II. "PERPETUITIES," THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, AND
PERPETUAL TRUSTS
A. The Rise of the Rule9
The canonical statement of the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities, formulated in 1886 by Professor John Chipman Gray, is
this: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest."20 Because of the deference paid to Gray's work by the courts,
the Rule has sometimes been treated as if Gray had invented it. In
truth, the Rule had a complicated evolution over several centuries.
1. Predicates to the Rule
Before the Statute of Uses (1535)21 and Statute of Wills (1540),22
there was little need for a rule limiting contingent future interests in
remote persons, as such interests were rare and easily destroyed before
becoming problematic.23 After those statutes, however, to deal with the
possibility of perpetuities arising from the new forms of disposition that
the statutes allowed, judges struggled to fashion a rule against
perpetuities without clearly defining what a perpetuity was.2 4 The
19. Portions of this section are adapted from DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 878-
82. In surveying the historical development of the Rule, we have relied primarily on GRAY, supra
note 12, §§ 123-200.1, at 126-90.
20 GRAY, supra note 12, § 201, at 191; see also Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal
Formalism, and the Transformation of Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439, 439-40 (1982)
(discussing Gray's role in transforming perpetuities law).
21. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Eng.).
22. 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
23. GRAY, supra note 12, § 134, at 134-35. In this period, some authority held that a future
interest could not be given to an "unborn child of an unborn person, because such a limitation
would be a possibility upon a possibility." Id. § 125, at 127. But whether this was a general rule
has been disputed. See id. § 133, at 133-34; Charles Sweet, The Rule in Whitby vs. Mitchell, 12
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 216 (1912).
24. See GRAY, supra note 12, §§ 140-68, at 138-61 (collecting authority leading up to the
Duke of Norfolk's Case); see also LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS, 1601-1740: THE
1774 [Vol. 67:6:1769
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prevailing understanding was that a perpetuity was an entail-that is,
an estate that would pass forever in accordance with a prescribed
succession so that the holder of the possessory interest could neither
alienate his interest nor alter the subsequent line of succession.25
The formal entail originated in the Statute De Donis
Conditionalibus (1285).26 Feudal barons, resisting the movement
toward free alienation of land, convinced Parliament to authorize in De
Donis the creation of the fee tail, an estate in land that passes to the
original tenant's descendants in a perpetual string of life estates.27
Courts responded by fashioning the "common recovery," a suit by which
the possessory tenant could transform his fee tail interest into fee
simple,28 a procedure known as "barring" or "docking" the entail.29 As
Gray put it, the common recovery "broke[ ] down the 'perpetuities' of
estates tail." 30
The lawyers for England's wealthy families fought back by
combining life estates in one generation with contingent remainders in
successive generations.31 In Gray's telling, "II]t occurred to some
ingenious person that it was perhaps possible to keep control over the
ownership of property for a time by granting an estate for life with
contingent remainders, for, as contingent remainders were not
transferable, no alienation of the fee could take place until they
vested."32 In response, the judges developed the law of future interests,
which allowed for the destruction of such remainders.33
ADOPTION OF THE STRICT SETTLEMENT 24-45 (1986) (discussing the "tortuous path to a
comprehensive rule against perpetuities").
25. "In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the word [perpetuity] was so generally used
in this sense that it might be said to be its normal meaning." Sweet, supra note 23, at 203.
26. 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (Eng.).
27. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1319-20.
28. The literature traces this procedure to Taltarum's Case, [1472] Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, fol. 19,
Mich., pl. 25 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 310-12 (H. A. L. Fisher ed., 1911).
29. See FRANCIS STOUGHTON SULLIVAN, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF
ENGLAND 167-69 (2d ed. 1776) (describing how judges barred entails). Use of the word "dock" as a
verb meaning "[t]o cut short in some part," especially "in the tail, hair, or similar appendage,"
traces back several centuries. 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 569 (James Augustus Henry
Murray ed., 1933).
30. GRAY, supra note 12, § 156, at 150.
31. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1320; see also BONFIELD, supra note 24, at 46-49
(describing use of life estates plus alternative contingent remainders in marriage settlements to
prevent the barring of an entail).
32. GRAY, supra note 12, § 141.4, at 140.
33. Id. at 140-41; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1320. Destruction was achieved
chiefly by way of the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders and the rule in Shelley's
Case. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1320 & n.71.
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The destructibility doctrines could be avoided, however, by using
executory interests, authorized by the Statute of Uses, instead of
contingent remainders.34 By this "ingenuity of conveyancers, aided by
the inadvertence of the judges,"35 wealthy landowners could again
implement "an infinite series of future interests that might remove land
permanently from commerce."36 Tellingly, the first cases to use the term
"perpetuity," decided in the 1590s, recognized the functional
equivalence of this use of indestructible executory interests to the
unbarrable entail.37
Across the 1600s, the judges developed the law of perpetuities in
answer to the indestructible executory interest-that is, to prevent
what was in function an entail by way of such interests. As Gray put it:
The evils arising from the Statute De Donis creating inalienable estates tail were familiar
to the courts, and after their predecessors had . . . broken down the "perpetuities" of
estates tail, . . . they were resolved not to have them surreptitiously introduced by
entailing long terms, to which the device of common recovery could not be applied. 38
Gray summarized the emerging body of perpetuities law thus: "Any
number of life interests could be given in succession to persons in being.
Limitations to unborn persons might be good[,] . . . but under what
restrictions was far from clear."39
2. The Duke of Norfolk's Case
The amorphous body of law governing perpetuities was
fashioned into the Rule Against Perpetuities in 1682 in the Duke of
Norfolk's Case.40 Thomas, the eldest son and heir apparent of the Earl
of Arundel, was incompetent. The earl therefore assumed that
34. See GRAY, supra note 12, § 152, at 147-48 (collecting authority holding that an executory
interest was not destructible).
35. Id. § 141.6, at 141.
36. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1320.
37. The cases are Corbet's Case, (1599) 76 Eng. Rep. 187 (K.B.) 187-99; 1 Co. Rep. 83 b, 83
b-88 b, and Chudleigh's Case, (1594) 76 Eng. Rep. 261 (K.B.) 261-325; 1 Co. Rep. 113 b, 113 b-
140 b. See GRAY, supra note 12, § 141.5, at 141 (observing that in those cases the court "quashed
both these kinds of perpetuities"); Percy Bordwell, The Iowa Contingent Remainder Act-The Rule
Against Perpetuities, 10 IOWA L. BULL. 275, 281 (1925) ("The three examples of perpetuity which
the judges in Corbet's Case and in Chudleigh's Case seem to have had in mind were the unbarrable
entail, the indestructible contingent or executory interest and the perpetual freehold. The
perpetual freehold was a limitation of life estates to successive generations of heirs." (citations
omitted)).
38. GRAY, supra note 12, § 156, at 150.
39. Id. § 168, at 160 & n.2.
40. (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.) 931-62; 3 Chan. Cas. 1, 1-52; see also GRAY, supra note
12, §§ 169-70, at 161-63 (discussing the importance of the Duke of Norfolk's Case); Herbert Barry,
The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REV. 538, 539-68 (1937) (same).
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eventually the earldom would descend to his second son, Henry. In that
event, the earl wanted the Barony of Grostock, which he planned to give
initially to Henry, to shift to his fourth son, Charles.
When the Earl of Arundel died, the earldom descended to
Thomas. Henry assumed control of the properties accompanying the
title. He also engineered restoration of the title "Duke of Norfolk" to the
family. When Thomas died, the dukedom descended to Henry (thus the
Duke of Norfolk's Case). But Henry did not want to give up the Barony
of Grostock. So Charles brought a bill in chancery to enforce his
interest. Henry resisted, arguing that the executory interest in Charles
was a perpetuity and thus void.
Sympathetic to the rational estate planning of a landowner with
an incompetent son, Lord Chancellor Nottingham was of the opinion
that Charles's interest would "wear out" in a single lifetime (Thomas's),
and, hence, it should not be regarded as a perpetuity.4 1 "A perpetuity,"
said Nottingham, "is the settlement of an estate or an interest in tail,
with such remainders expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power
of the tenant in tail in possession to dock by any recovery or
assignment."42 The critical issue was the time at which the contingent
future interest would vest. Nottingham ruled that, if a future interest
necessarily would vest or fail during or at the end of a life in being, it is
good.43 The House of Lords agreed.44
3. Toward Lives in Being Plus Twenty-One Years
After the Duke of Norfolk's Case, the judges refined the test for
a perpetuity in relation to Nottingham's life-in-being holding. By 1732,
we find in Stanley v. Leigh the term "perpetuity" described as "a legal
word or term of art" meaning "the limiting [ofl an estate ... in such
manner as would render it unalienble longer than for a life or lives in
being at the same time, and some short or reasonable time after."4 5 Four
years later, in Stephens v. Stephens, the permissible perpetuities period
was clarified as including the minority of a beneficiary, up to twenty-
one years, in addition to lives in being.46 In 1805, Thellusson v.
Woodford established that any number of lives in being that could
41. 22 Eng. Rep. at 948; 3 Chan. Cas. at 29.
42. Id. at 949; 3 Chan. Cas. at 31.
43. Id. at 960-61; 3 Chan. Cas. at 49-50.
44. See Barry, supra note 40, at 557-61 (discussing the subsequent history of the case).
45. (1732) 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.) 917-18; 2 P. Wmns. 686, 688.
46. (1736) 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (Ch.) 752; Cases t. Talb. 228, 232.
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reasonably be traced could be used.4 7 Finally, in Cadell v. Palmer,
decided in 1833, the perpetuities period was settled at any reasonable
number of lives in being plus twenty-one years in gross plus any actual
periods of gestation. 48
Significantly, in the first edition of Blackstone's Commentaries,
in a volume published in 1766, we find the statement hat "[t]he utmost
length that has been hitherto allowed, for the contingency of an
executory devise of either kind to happen in, is that of a life or lives in
being, and one and twenty years afterwards."4 9 Blackstone was the
leading authority for "the common law at the point of American
separation," one in which "[t]he American Founders were steeped."50
As developed by the judges after the Duke of Norfolk's Case, the
Rule Against Perpetuities permitted a donor's freedom of disposition to
be exercised in a way that included indestructible contingent future
interests, but only as regards persons the donor could have known (lives
in being) plus the minority of the next generation (plus twenty-one
years).51 The underlying purpose of the Rule was to prevent
resurrection of the entail by way of a string of successive life estates
subject to indestructible contingent future interests. Brian Simpson's
capsule summary is apt:
[T]here were many expressions of hostility to perpetuities, and a perpetuity meant an
unbarrable entail, in whatever guise it appeared. This hostility found expression in... the
celebrated "rule against perpetuities." . . This doctrine . . .prevented the evolution, under
some newer guise, of any form of perpetual unbarrable entail, but permitted unbarrable
entails of limited duration. 52
47. (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ch.) 1043; 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 146. Thellusson is also the origin of
the common law rule against accumulations of income. See PATRICK POLDEN, PETER THELLUSON'S
WILL OF 1797 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON CHANCERY LAW 176-84 (2002); Robert H. Sitkoff, The
Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 501, 503-07 (2006).
48. (1833) 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L.) 974-75; 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 421.
49. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *174.
50. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 841-42 (2009).
51. Sir Arthur Hobhouse famously summarized this functional logic for the "lives in being"
test thus:
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events which
the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see. Within the former
province we may trust his natural affections and his capacity of judgment to make
better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for him. Within the latter,
natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment is constantly baffled by the
course of events.
Arthur Hobhouse, The Devolution and Transfer of Land, in THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE
SUBJECT OF ENDOWMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS OF PROPERTY 188 (1880).
52. A.W.B. Simpson, Entails and Perpetuities, 24 JURID. REV. 1, 17 (1979).
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B. Reforming the Rule53
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule of logical
proof. A contingent future interest is void at the outset if it is not certain
to vest or fail-that one or the other must happen-within twenty-one
years after the death of a life in being at the creation of the interest. In
practice, therefore, the Rule became, as Professor W. Barton Leach
famously complained, "a trap to the draftsman."54 By giving recurring
mistakes under the Rule ludicrous but memorable names-such as the
fertile octogenarian, unborn widow, and slothful executor 55-Leach
drew attention to the Rule's exasperating complexities and absurd
assumptions in a way that fired up a reform movement.56
The ensuing reform of the Rule can be sorted into two basic
categories: reformation (or cy pres) and wait-and-see.5 7 The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (1986) ("USRAP"), adopted in
about half the states,5 8 adopts both wait-and-see and reformation, as
does a new Restatement provision published in late 2011.59 Crucially,
however, each of these reforms is true to the historical purpose of the
Rule in that none permits perpetual entailment of property. Each
preserves a limit on the duration of indestructible contingent future
interests that is a reasonable approximation of the common law period
of lives in being plus twenty-one years.60
1. Reformation
Application of the reformation doctrine to avoid a perpetuities
violation is authorized by statute or judicial decision in many states.1
Under this reform, a court may modify a trust that violates the Rule to
carry out the settlor's intent within the perpetuities period. For
53. Portions of this section are adapted from DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 882-
95.
54. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 643 (1938).
55. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 884-89 (describing these and other
fantastical happenings in perpetuities land, including the precocious toddler, the magic gravel pit,
the war that never ends, and the birthday present that blows up).
56. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952).
57. A third category is self-help by way of a saving clause, which guards against an
overlooked violation of the Rule. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 890-91.
58. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 5, at tbl.9 (surveying state perpetuities laws).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.1 (2011).
60. The aim of Leach and the other reformers was to permit "reasonable dispositions" that
did not offend the anti-dead hand policy of the Rule. In Leach's words, "this is a job for the repair
shop, not the scrap yard." Leach, supra note 56, at 748.
61. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 5, at tbl.9 (surveying state perpetuities laws).
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example, a court might change the period of an executory interest from
twenty-five years after the death of a life in being to twenty-one years
or insert a saving clause adapted to the particular possibility that would
otherwise cause the gift to be invalid.6 2 Because the donor undoubtedly
intended the gift to be valid, reformation carries out the donor's
probable intent-but only within the period of the Rule. As such,
reformation does not undermine the function of the Rule as a policy
limit on the temporal scope of freedom of disposition.
2. Wait-and-See
Probably the more important reform is the wait-and-see
doctrine. This reform replaces the what-might-happen possibilities test
of the common law Rule with a what-does-happen test.63 In a state that
has adopted wait-and-see, the court will wait and see what actually
happens; it will not invalidate an interest because of what might
happen.
But for how long should a court wait and see? Leach believed
that the common law provided an inherent wait-and-see period-the
lives relevant to vesting of the interest plus twenty-one years.64 The
Restatement (Second) of Property, published in 1983, prescribed a fixed
list of measuring lives. 65 USRAP, promulgated three years later in
1986, prescribed a fixed wait-and-see period of ninety years.6 In
England, Parliament adopted an eighty-year period in 1964 and then a
125-year period in 2009.67
The theory behind switching from lives in being plus twenty-one
years to a fixed term of years was one of simplification. Professor
Lawrence W. Waggoner, the reporter for USRAP, explained that the
drafters of the uniform rule tried to approximate "the average period of
time that would traditionally be allowed by the wait-and-see
62. These examples are suggested in Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1898-901 (1986).
63. The rise of wait-and-see was accompanied by a furious academic debate. See, e.g., W.
Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960); Lewis
M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV.
179 (1953); see also Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH.
L. REV. 323, 332-34 (1990) (discussing the "Perpetuities Wars").
64. Leach, supra note 63, at 1145-46; Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1656 (1985).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3 (1983).
66. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 (amended 1990).
67. See D.J. HAYTON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 106 (4th ed. 2003); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 2009, c. 18, §§ 5, 7 (Eng. & Wales).
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doctrine."68 It is true that ninety years is a fair, though probably
shorter, approximation of the period that could be obtained with an
aggressive perpetuities saving clause. The recent English move to 125
years was based on similar reasoning. The Law Commission's report
presaging the legislation concluded plausibly that 125 years "is
probably the longest period that can be obtained under the present
law."69
Because wait-and-see-whether for lives in being plus twenty-
one years, ninety years, or even 125 years-limits the dead hand to the
common law perpetuities period or a reasonable approximation of that
period, it honors the basic policy of the Rule. Replacing the what-might-
happen test of the common law with a what-does-happen test, even
across ninety or 125 years, does not permit a "perpetuity" by way of
ongoing entailment of property.
3. The Restatement (Third) of Property
In a Restatement provision published in 2011, the American
Law Institute promulgated a new perpetuities rule with a two-
generation wait-and-see period followed by reformation.70 Generally
speaking, the two-generation period is measured by the life of any
beneficiary who is no more than two generations younger than the
settlor.7 1 The Restatement herefore allows for a person not in being at
the creation of the interest to be a measuring life, but only if that person
is no more than two generations younger than the settlor.72 Which is to
say, the Restatement does not authorize a functional entail. To the
contrary, a two-generation trust has long been possible under the
68. LawrenceW. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory RuleAgainstPerpetuities: The Rationale
of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162 (1988). Waggoner's article was a
response to criticisms of the ninety-year rule in Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLAL. REV. 1023 (1987).
69. ENG. LAW COMM'N, REPORT No. 251, THE RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND EXCESSIVE
ACCUMULATIONS 101 § 8.13 (1998), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/
lc251_TheRulesAgainstPerpetuities and Accumulations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
CHY2-USD5.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.1 (2011).
71. Id. § 27.1(b)(1).
72. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes a New Approach to
Perpetuities: Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger Generations 7 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 200, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1614936, archived at http://perma.cc/4VBT-X9LL. For a critical take, see Scott
Andrew Shepard, Which the Deader Hand? A Counter to the American Law Institute's Proposed
Revival of Dying Perpetuities Rules, 86 TUL. L. REV. 559 (2012).
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common law Rule. The new Restatement rule is, at bottom, a simplified
approximation of the traditional perpetuities period. 73
C. Abrogating the Rule to Allow Perpetual Trusts74
The rise of the perpetual trust has been covered in depth
elsewhere.75 For present purposes, it will suffice to review: (1) the role
of the federal transfer taxes in sparking the perpetual trust movement,
(2) the race among the states to permit perpetual trusts, and (3) the
basic structure of a prototypical contemporary perpetual trust. Because
the statutes authorizing perpetual trusts permit perpetual entailment
of property down the generations, they represent a sharp break from
the common law tradition, going back several centuries, of proscribing
entails "in whatever guise [they] appeared."7 6
1. The Role of the Federal Transfer Taxes
Prior to 1986, it was possible to avoid the estate tax, enacted in
1916, by way of successive life interests.7 7 A donor could leave property
to her child for life, then to her grandchild for life, and so on. Because a
life estate terminates at death, and because the estate tax is levied only
on the decedent's transferable interests, in the foregoing example there
would be no tax when, on the death of the child, the grandchild's
interest became possessory. Other than the tax levied on the original
transfer creating the string of life estates, there would be no further
transfer tax levied until the death of the final remainderperson, who
would have taken the property in fee simple.
Normally this strategy would be implemented by way of a trust.
O would create a trust for the benefit of her daughter, A, for life, then
73. Professor Waggoner, the principal architect of the new Restatement, elaborates:
Under the traditional lives-in-being approach, the longest-living individual who serves
as a measuring life will eventually die, but that individual can be someone who is more
than two generations younger than the transferor and can outlive the transferor by
many decades, maybe even a century, but not much more and often less. Under the two-
younger-generations approach, the longest-living individual who serves as a measuring
life will eventually die, but that individual can be someone who is conceived and born
after the transferor's death and can outlive the transferor by many decades, maybe even
a century, but not much more and often less.. . . Although the length of the two periods
will be different in individual cases, the average length will probably work out to be
about the same.
Waggoner, supra note 72, at 9.
74. Portions of this section draw on Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 364-89, and
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 2476-81.
75. See sources cited supra note 5.
76. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
77. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1312.
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to her granddaughter, B, for life, and so on, with as many future
interests down the generations as permitted by the Rule Against
Perpetuities. To preserve flexibility, each generation could be given a
power to appoint the remainder in further trust to persons in the next
generation, but this is a detail that can be set aside for now.78 For
present purposes, the key points are two: First, the duration of a trust
structured in this way-a tax-motivated partial resurrection of the
entail-was curtailed by the Rule. Second, Congress tried to close the
successive -life -estates loophole in 1986 with the generation-skipping
transfer ("GST") tax.
The GST tax imposes a tax equal to the highest rate of the estate
tax on any generation-skipping transfer.79 In rough terms, a transfer to
a grandchild, great-grandchild, or any other person who is two or more
generations below the transferor is a generation-skipping transfer.80
However, under the 1986 Act, every person was given an exemption to
pass $1 million, now $5.34 million, free from federal wealth transfer
taxes, including the GST tax.81 By funding a trust with the amount of
the settlor's exemption, successive generations can benefit from the
trust fund, including subsequent appreciation, free from federal wealth
transfer taxes.
As the prominent Boston estate planning lawyer Raymond
Young foresaw in testimony to Congress in 1984, the combination of the
GST tax and the exemption was sure to invite increased use of
generation-skipping trusts, albeit Young assumed that such trusts
would be limited in duration by the Rule Against Perpetuities.82 So did
Congress. It put no limit on the duration of a transfer-tax-exempt rust,
78. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing powers of appointment in perpetual trusts).
79. The GST tax provisions are located in Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C.
§§ 2601-63 (2012).
80. See id. §§ 2611 (defining generation-skipping transfer), 2612 (defining taxable events),
2613 (defining skip and nonskip persons), 2651 (defining generational assignments).
81. See id. §§ 20 10(c) (providing for an estate tax credit up to $5 million), 263 1(c) (providing
for a GST tax credit of up to $5 million). The $5.34 million figure reflects the statutory inflation
adjustment announced by the IRS for 2014 in Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
82. Young testified:
However, we are obliged to point out to you that if [the 1986 GST tax] is adopted ... it
will be an inducement to generation skipping. You will have more generation skipping
than you ever had under pre-1976 law, and there will be a greater erosion of the tax
base, because you will have the banks, lawyers, financial planners, and all others
saying, here you are, this is a specially created opportunity for you. Congress has said
you can take $1 million, put it aside, no generation-skipping tax.
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways andMeans, 98th Cong.
335-36 (1984) (testimony of Raymond H. Young, Chairman, GST Tax Subcommittee, Boston Bar




leaving that matter to be handled by state perpetuities law.83 In
consequence, if a state's perpetuities law allowed a longer-term trust,
more generations could benefit from the trust fund, free from transfer
taxes. If a state were to permit a perpetual trust, successive generations
could benefit from the trust fund, free from subsequent federal transfer
taxation, forever.
2. The Race to Allow Perpetual Trusts
For reasons that are not entirely clear, South Dakota abolished
its Rule Against Perpetuities in 1983, a few years before the 1986 GST
tax.8 4 Whatever the reason, the timing was fortuitous. Trust companies
in South Dakota began advertising for out-of-state trust business by
touting South Dakota as a place where a "generation skipping trust"
was "possible" because "there is no rule against perpetuities."85 To keep
up, in 1995, Delaware repealed its Rule as applied to interests in trust.
The official synopsis of the Delaware legislation notes that South
Dakota's repeal had given it "a competitive advantage over Delaware in
attracting assets held in trusts created for estate planning
purposes. . . . Several financial institutions have now organized or
acquired trust companies, particularly in South Dakota, at least in part
to take advantage of their favorable trust law."8 6
83. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 394 (Comm. Print 2005) ("When Congress originally
enacted a tax on generation skipping transfers, it noted that '[m]ost States have a rule against
perpetuities which limits the duration of a trust.' ").
84. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 5, at 2480-81 & n.61 (stating that "the legislative
record of South Dakota's 1983 repeal, although scanty, implies that the purpose . . . was to attract
trust business"). Idaho and Wisconsin had even earlier abolished their versions of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. See id. at 2473. But because those states levied a tax on income held in trust, they
were not as desirable a situs for the creation of tax-avoiding perpetual trusts. See id. at 2490-91
(pointing to empirical evidence supporting this claim).
85. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 897 (reproducing one such ad).
86. H.R. 245, 138th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 1995) (bill synopsis).
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Figure 1: Perpetual Trusts Authorized (2013)
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The Delaware statute triggered a race to authorize perpetual
trusts. As illustrated by Figure 1, today perpetual or effectively
perpetual trusts appear to be authorized in Alabama (360 years),
Alaska (1,000 years), Arizona (500 years), Colorado (1,000 years),
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida (360 years), Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada (365 years), New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee (360
years), Utah (1,000 years), Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (1,000
years).87
87. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 5, at 9001-82 (surveying state perpetuities laws); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note (2011)
(collecting and classifying the statutes). Following Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 433 &
n. 187, we have excluded Washington's 150-year rule.
Some of the perpetual trust states have abolished the Rule altogether. Others have
abolished the Rule as applied to interests in trusts in which the trustee has the power to sell the
trust property and then reinvest the proceeds; that is, for trusts that do not suspend the power of
alienation. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. Still others have abolished the Rule as
applied to interests in personal property. Perhaps the oddest change is in the states that have
transmogrified the Rule, which had been a mandatory limit on freedom of disposition, into a
default rule that applies unless the settlor provides otherwise. At common law, the Rule was "not
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The race to authorize perpetual trusts was facilitated by two
facts on the ground. First, wealth today is held predominately in
portable liquid financial assets rather than in land.88 Liquid assets are
easy to move to a jurisdiction with more favorable law, whereas land
has long been subject to a situs choice-of-law rule.89 Second, it is
generally assumed that by naming a trustee located in another state
and giving that trustee custody of the trust fund, a settlor can be
assured that courts will enforce a provision specifying that the law of
that state is to govern the validity and administration of the trust.90
Some perpetual trust states even provide for this outcome expressly by
statute,9 1 as does the Uniform Trust Code.92 Together, these two points
explain the political economy of the rise of the perpetual trust. Lawyers
and bankers have lobbied for perpetual trusts to attract, or at least to
retain, trust business.
3. Resurrecting the Entail
Here is a simplified example of the structure of a contemporary
transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust.93 0 funds a trust with her
exemption amount to pay the income to her daughter, A, for life. The
a rule of construction, but a peremptory command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a
test, more or less artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention." GRAY, supra
note 12, § 629, at 599.
88. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 725-29 (1988) (surveying the shift in wealth from land to
liquid assets and human capital).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 278-79 (1971) (situs rule for
validity and administration of trust of land); see also James Y. Stern, Property, Exclusivity, and
Jurisdiction, 100 VA. L. REV. 111, 150-58 (2014) (analyzing the situs rule).
90. See, e.g., Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 6, at 373-75 ("To ensure that the law of
state B will govern the validity and administration of a trust created by a settlor who resides in
state A, lawyers usually advise the settlor not only to provide in the trust instrument that the law
of state B is to govern, but also to name a trustee located in state B and to give that trustee custody
of the trust fund."); Sterk, supra note 5, at 2101-04 (explaining reasons for naming an institutional
trustee in the state whose law is chosen to govern the validity of the trust). The common law is in
accord. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) ("An inter vivos trust of interests
in movables is valid if valid under the local law of the state designated by the settlor to govern the
validity of the trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to this trust . . . .").
91. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (2013) (providing that an Alaska choice-of-law
provision will be enforced if the trust is administered in Alaska); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-3-48
(2013) (providing that South Dakota law governs trusts administered in South Dakota unless the
settlor provides otherwise).
92. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 108(a), 403(2)-(3) (amended 2010) (providing for enforcement
of a choice-of-law provision naming the state in which a trustee is located); see also Eugene F.
Scoles, Choice of Law in Trusts: Uniform Trust Code, Sections 107 and 403, 67 Mo. L. REV. 213
(2002) (discussing the choice-of-law provisions in the Uniform Trust Code).
93. This example is based on the form reproduced as Appendix A in RICHARD W. NENNO,
DELAWARE TRUSTS 333-47 (2012).
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trust instrument gives A the power to appoint the trust corpus outright
or in further trust to such of O's descendants, other than herself, as A
names by deed or by will. A is not given the power to appoint the trust
property to herself, because such a power would give her ownership
equivalence, which would bring the property into her taxable estate and
would expose it to her creditors.94 On A's death, the remainder not
appointed by A is to be held in separate share trusts for each of A's
children, subject to the same terms, thus restarting the cycle. The
contemporary perpetual trust is, in other words, a modern fee tail.95
To be sure, in the example just given, each generation has the
power to bring an end to the trust by giving the property outright to the
next generation rather than in further trust. But the next generation
cannot compel the prior generation to do so. Nor can the current
generation take the property for itself. There is, in other words, no
procedure by which to "dock" this entail.96 Moreover, the power in one
generation to appoint the property outright to the next generation is a
feature of the trust as we have sketched it in accordance with standard
formbook language.97 Such a power is not required. To the contrary, in
a state that has authorized perpetual trusts, 0 could create a trust for
life benefit of each successive generation in perpetuity, with no power
in those successive generations to terminate the trust or change the
order of succession.98 Which is to say, 0 could create a fee tail.
III. PERPETUITIES IN THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Eleven states have adopted constitutional bans on perpetuities,
though two, Florida and California, later repealed them. These
provisions, which are closely linked as a matter of historical
94. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 800-04 (discussing taxation of, and creditor
rights over, property subject to a power of appointment).
95. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
96. In recognition of this point, traditional perpetuities law treats the original donor as still
controlling the property, and not the holder of the power, if the power cannot be exercised in favor
of the holder of the power. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 909-11 (surveying
application of the Rule to powers of appointment).
97. See NENNO, supra note 93, at 333-47; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at
902-03 ("Model forms for perpetual trusts typically include a provision that gives each generation
a nongeneral power to appoint the remainder to the next generation outright or in further
trust . . . ."); Bridget J. Crawford, Commentary, Who is Afraid of Perpetual Trusts?, 111 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 79, 86 (2012) ("[W]ith many perpetual trusts, each generation of
beneficiaries will have the ability to decide whether to continue the trust or not.").
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 24.4 cmt.
c (2011) ("A disposition 'to A for life, then to A's issue from time to time living forever' creates an
estate that is . . . substantially equivalent to a fee tail estate. Such a disposition is valid except as
curtailed by the Rule Against Perpetuities."); infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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development, can be grouped into four overlapping generations. Within
each generation, the text of the provisions is substantively identical.
And while the text varies across generations, all the provisions can be
traced back to the North Carolina original.99 Figure 2 indicates the nine
states that currently have constitutional perpetuities prohibitions.
Figure 2: Constitutional Perpetuities Bans (2013)
iS L G4
A. First Generation
North Carolina was the first state to adopt a constitutional ban
on perpetuities.100 It did so in December of 1776 in the following
provision of the state's Declaration of Rights: "[P]erpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and ought not to
99. Gray likewise traced these provisions back to North Carolina. GRAY, supra note 12, § 731,
at 670.
100. For a suggestion of why North Carolina was the only of the original thirteen colonies to
have such a provision in its constitution, see Joshua C. Tate, Perpetuities and the Genius of a Free
State, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1823 (2014). Tate argues that, although "the policy reasons that justified
a ban on perpetuities were known to all the colonists, they were more salient for the constitutional
delegates from North Carolina in 1776 because of their recent experience of instability caused by
the hereditary title of an absentee English lord." Id. at 1833.
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be allowed."101 Tennessee in 1796, Florida in 1838, and Wyoming in
1889 adopted nearly identical provisions.102 Each remains in force
today, except for the Florida provision, which was dropped from the
state's new constitution in 1868.103 Given the timing, that omission
surely was unrelated to the perpetual trust movement, which arose
more than a century later. 104
In structure, the first-generation constitutional bans on
perpetuities resemble the Thirteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution in two respects. First, like the Thirteenth Amendment,
which establishes a categorical ban on "slavery" without regard for state
action, 105 the first-generation perpetuities bans are categorical and not
limited to governmental action. As has been held regarding the
Thirteenth Amendment, the first- generation perpetuities bans
therefore appear to pertain to both state action and private conduct, 106
and indeed the case law that has arisen under the bans is in accord. 107
Second, just as the proscription of "slavery" is unaccompanied by
definition and so has been construed by courts in light of text, history,
and purpose, 10 8 so too the state constitutional perpetuities bans do not
define "perpetuities," leaving the matter to be resolved by courts as a
matter of constitutional interpretation.
So what is a perpetuity within the contemplation of these
provisions? It seems clear that the term "perpetuities" references the
101. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII. The current version in North
Carolina substitutes "shall not" for "ought not to," but otherwise is identical. See N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 34 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 1970 amendments). For general background on the North
Carolina Constitution of 1776, see ORTH & NEWBY, supra note 11, at 2-12.
102. The Florida provision is a verbatim copy of the original North Carolina provision. See
FLA. CONST. of 1838, § 24. The Tennessee and Wyoming provisions are substantively identical but
substitute "shall not" for "ought not to." See TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. 11, § 23 ("That perpetuities
& monopolies are contrary to the Genius of a free State and shall not be allowed."); WYO. CONST.
of 1889, art. 1, § 30 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and
shall not be allowed.").
103. See 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 467 (1914) ("The Florida Constitution of 1838 and also that of 1865 have
the North Carolina provision, but the Constitution of 1868 dropped it.").
104. Florida did not allow long-enduring trusts by statute until 2000. See An Act Relating to
Trusts, ch. 2000-245, § 1, 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (2000) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225,
scattered subsections of § 737 (West 2014)) (extending the perpetuities period for trusts created
after December 31, 2000 to 360 years).
105. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime wherof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
106. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-15, at 924-25 (3d ed. 2000).
107. See infra Part V.A-B. (surveying the cases).
108. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971) (interpreting the Thirteenth
Amendment in light of its text, history, and purpose).
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entailment of property for at least three reasons. First, "perpetuities"
appears twice in the 1776 North Carolina Constitution-first in the
Declaration of Rights, in the provision at issue, and again in the
structural provisions. This further provision states that "the future
legislature of this State shall regulate entails, in such a manner as to
prevent perpetuities," 1 09 implying that the former (entails) gives rise to
the latter (perpetuities).110 Similar provisions commanding legislation
to regulate entails so as to prevent perpetuities appeared in the
contemporaneous constitutions of Pennsylvania (1776) and Vermont
(1777).111
Second, the word "perpetuity" was a legal term of art in 1776,
defined in contemporary law dictionaries as an entail or its functional
equivalent. A 1750 dictionary, for example, defined perpetuity as "when
an Estate is designed to be so settled in Tail, &c. that it cannot be
undone or made void; as where if all the Parties who have Interest join,
they cannot bar or pass the Estate."1 12 Another dictionary, published in
1792, is to similar effect: "Perpetuity is, where if all that have interest
join in the conveyance, yet they cannot bar or pass the estate; for if, by
concurrence of all having interest, the estate may be barred, it is no
perpetuity."1 13  Moreover, the first edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries, published ten years prior to the adoption of the 1776
North Carolina Constitution, describes a perpetuity as "the settlement
of an interest, which shall go in the succession prescribed, without any
power of alienation."11 4 Together, these sources lend support to Gray's
conclusion that "[t]he natural, the original, meaning of a perpetuity is
an inalienable, indestructible interest."115
109. N.C. CONST. of 1776, The Constitution or Form of Government, art. XLIII.
110. Amar calls this mode of interpretation intratextualism. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747 (1999).
111. See PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 37 ("The future legislature of this state, shall regulate
intails in such a manner as to prevent perpetuities."); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 34 ("The future
legislature of this State, shall regulate entails, in such manner as to prevent perpetuities."). Today,
only Vermont retains such a provision. See VT. CONST. ch. II, § 63 ("The Legislature shall regulate
entails in such manner as to prevent perpetuities.").
112. GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 536 (6th ed. 1750). It continues, "[B]ut if by the
Concurrence of all having the Estate-tail, it may be barred, it is no Perpetuity." Id.; see also THE
STUDENT'S LAW DICTIONARY; OR, COMPLEAT ENGLISH LAW-EXPOSITOR (1740) ("Perpetuity ... is
used where an Estate is intended so to be settled in Tail, &c. that it cannot possibly be undone or
made void, a Thing our Law will not bear, and on that Account all Perpetuities are avoided");
TERMES DE LA LEY 321 (1721) ("[W]here an estate is so designed to be settled in tail, etc., that it
cannot be undone or made void.").
113. 2 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, ANEW LAW DICTIONARY 205 (1792).
114. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *174.
115. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 140, at 91 (1st ed. 1886); see
also GRAY, supra note 12, § 140.5, at 141 (When "the term 'perpetuity [was] ... used for the first
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Third, that the term "perpetuity" includes functional as well as
formal entails is evident from the history of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. As we have seen, the Rule was fashioned to prevent a
resurrection of the entail by "ingenious person[s]" via an endless series
of indestructible contingent future interests.116 The first cases to use
the term perpetuity, decided in the 1590s, recognized this
equivalence.117 In the Duke of Norfolk's Case, decided nearly a century
before adoption of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, Lord
Chancellor Nottingham said that a perpetuity involved "the settlement
of an estate or interest in tail, with such remainders expectant upon it,
as are in no sort in the power of the legal tenant in tail in possession to
dock by any recovery or assignment."1 1 8 By 1732, in Stanley v. Leigh,
the term "perpetuity" was described as "a legal word or term of art"
meaning "the limiting [of] an estate ... in such manner as would render
it unalienble longer than for a life or lives in being at the same time,
and some short or reasonable time after."1 19
B. Second Generation
The second generation of constitutional perpetuities bans uses
almost identical language to that of the first, with one substantive
addition. This generation begins with the 1836 Constitution of the
Republic of Texas, which provides, "Perpetuities or monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall not be allowed;
nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this
Republic."120 The only difference between this provision and the North
Carolina model is the italicized language that bars primogeniture and
entailments. Arkansas in 1874 and Oklahoma in 1907 adopted
time in our law, . . . there were two kinds of perpetuities: First, An estate tail with a condition or
clause of cesser intended to prevent alienation. Second, A future contingent interest limited by
way of use.").
116. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
120. TEX. CONST. of 1836, Declaration of Rights, § 17 (emphasis added); see also J.E. Ericson,
Origins of the Texas Bill of Rights, 62 Sw. HIST. Q. 457, 460 (1959) (noting that the new Texas
provision "included also prohibitions against the English common law practices of primogeniture
and entailment, not to be found in American constitutions of that time"). From 1836 to 1845, Texas
was an independent sovereign. See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Republic of
Texas: Part 1 of 2, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 145 (2005) (providing background on the Republic of Texas's
constitution).
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constitutional perpetuities bans substantially similar to the Texas
model. 121
The history of the Texas provision provides strong evidence of a
connection to the first generation. The first proposed Texas
Constitution, while it was still part of the Mexican state of Coahuila y
Tejas, followed the North Carolina model precisely, without any
mention of primogeniture: "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to
the genius of a free government, and shall not be allowed."122 The
additional bar on primogeniture and entailments was added without
substantive discussion in 1836, probably modeled on Spain's then-
recent abolishment of entailments.123 Primogeniture was resisted by
the colonists for many of the same anti-aristocratic reasons that they
resisted the entail. 124
C. Third Generation
The third generation begins with California's 1849 Constitution.
The California text differs from those of the first two generations in that
it does not include a reference to monopolies or to the genius of a free
state. Instead, it provides simply, "No perpetuities shall be allowed
except for eleemosynary purposes."125 Nevada in 1864 and Montana in
1889 followed California's lead, though Montana's version substitutes
the plainer term "charitable" for "eleemosynary." 126 California repealed
121. The Arkansas and Oklahoma versions have minor, nonsubstantive textual variations.
See ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 19 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of
a republic, and shall not be allowed; nor shall any hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors
ever be granted or conferred in this State."); OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. II, § 32 ("Perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall
the law of primo geniture or entailments ever be in force in this State.").
122. CONSTITUTION OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, art. XIX (proposed
1833), available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/constitutions/texas1833, archived at http://
perma.cc/PZG9-TLPB.
123. See Ericson, supra note 120, at 460 (making this point); see also Gortario v. Cantu, 7 Tex.
35, 46-47 (1851) (noting the connection between the Texas prohibition and Spanish law). Ericson
suggests that either Maryland or North Carolina may have been the original model for the
perpetuities prohibition, Ericson, supra note 120, at 460, but Maryland's constitution prohibited
only monopolies and not also perpetuities. See MD. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights, art.
XXXIX ("That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles
of commerce; and ought not to be suffered."). Tate observes that "at least one-third of the framers
of the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas were likely to have been directly or indirectly
familiar with the language of the North Carolina provision." Tate, supra note 100, at 1824 n.2.
124. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
125. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 16.
126. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIX, § 5 ("No perpetuities shall be allowed, except for




its provision in 1970,127 though (as in Florida) apparently not in an
effort to extend trust duration. 128
The link between California's ban and the prior generations is
not obvious based on text alone. However, the records of the convention
at which California's provision was first adopted suggest a connection.
When a perpetuities ban was first proposed, the text was: "That
perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic,
and shall not be allowed; nor shall any hereditary emoluments,
privileges, or honors, ever be conferred in this State."129 This language
closely tracks the earlier generations of constitutional prohibitions,
reflecting the original North Carolina model (the "genius of a republic")
plus the second generation's additional ban on primogeniture. The
convention rejected this proposal, but not on substantive grounds-it
was thought to be out of place in the section in which it was proposed. 130
When the prohibition was later suggested for inclusion in a different
portion of the constitution, it was adopted without dissent in the
simpler form quoted in the prior paragraph. 131
D. Fourth Generation
Arizona's 1911 constitutional perpetuities ban marks a fourth
generation. Arizona's version, which has not been copied elsewhere,
provides: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges, or powers shall be
granted or conferred, and no law shall be enacted permitting any
127. See CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 9 (West, Westlaw through June 2014) (noting repeal as of Nov.
3, 1970); see also Orth, supra note 9, at 405 n.29 (noting 1970 repeal).
128. In 1991, California adopted USRAP, see Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities,
ch. 156 (A.B. 1577), 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West), and even today it does not permit perpetual
trusts. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21205 (West 2014).
129. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF
THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849 46 (J. Ross Brown ed., 1850)
(provision submitted by Mr. Ord).
130. See id. ("Mr. Halleck thought the subject properly came in another part of the
Constitution."); id. at 47 ("Mr. Jones considered the proposed section one of much
importance.... But a declaration of the genius of a Republic in relation to those equal rights which
we claim for all citizens, would come more appropriately in the bill of rights."); see also Gerdes,
supra note 9, at 92 n.48 (stating the proposed amendment against perpetuities was not adopted
because it was more appropriately suited for "another part of the Constitution").
131. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 129, at 272
(reporting on proposal and its justification thus: "It is to prevent perpetuity of lands from families
to families. It is upon perpetuities that aristocracies are built up."); Gerdes, supra note 9, at 92
n.48 (stating amendment was adopted without debate). The exception for "eleemosynary purposes"
was added later in the convention. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF
CALIFORNIA, supra note 129, at 376 (reporting amendment without substantive discussion);
Gerdes, supra note 9, at 92 n.48 ("'No perpetuities shall be allowed' was amended by adding'except
for the eleemosynary purposes' ..... ).
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perpetuity or entailment in this State."132 The combination of
perpetuities with entailment is familiar from the earlier generations,
but the structure of this provision is unique. It provides that "no law
shall be enacted," whereas no other state's provision is so expressly
directed at the legislature. Moreover, no other state pairs a perpetuities
ban with similar prohibitions of "emoluments, privileges, or powers."
Despite these unique features, the historical evidence suggests
that Arizona's prohibition derives from the North Carolina original. 133
The United States took most of the territory that would become Arizona
in 1848, at the end of the Mexican-American War,134 and bought the
remainder as part of the Gadsden Purchase of 1853.135 During the early
years of U.S. control, Arizona was part of the Territory of New
Mexico. 136 In an Act of July 12, 1851, the Territory adopted a Bill of
Rights that included a perpetuities ban that followed Texas's second-
generation model: "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the
law of primogeniture or entailment ever be in force in this Territory."137
That prohibition became the law of the newly formed Territory of
Arizona in 1863.138 Thus, although Arizona's first constitution in 1911
adopted different ext, the territory had been operating for over fifty
years under a perpetuities ban in its fundamental law that can be
traced back to North Carolina.139
132. ARIz. CONST. of 1911, art. II, § 29.
133. See, e.g., JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 103 (2d ed. 2013) ("This
provision ... was taken from earlier state constitutions that were closer in time to the practices of
aristocracy and nobility it condemns.... It endorses the democratic ideal of a free society providing
equal opportunity for all, including each succeeding generation.").
134. See id. at 3-4 ("Most of the area now within the state was acquired by the United States
in 1848 in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the war with Mexico.").
135. Id. at 4 (noting that roughly the southern quarter of the state "was acquired from Mexico
in the Gadsden Treaty of 1853").
136. Id. at 4 & n.4.
137. Act Declaring and Establishing the Rights of the People of the Territory of New Mexico
§ 17, H.R. Misc. 4, 32 Cong., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1851), reprinted in SEC'Y OF THE TERRITORY OF N.M.,
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO 32 (1918); see also Richard R.
Powell, Perpetuities in Arizona, 1 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 233 (1959) (discussing the legislative history
of perpetuities in the territory that became Arizona).
138. Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Arizona, ch. 56, 58, 12 Stat.
664, 665 (1863) ("[A]11 legislative enactments of the Territory of New Mexico not inconsistent with
the provisions of this act, are hereby extended to and continued in force in the said Territory of
Arizona .... ); see Powell, supra note 137, at 233-34 (observing that Arizona split off from New
Mexico in 1863).
139. See also Powell, supra note 137, at 233 (noting "earlier appearances of similar language




Table 1 summarizes the four generations of constitutional
perpetuities provisions.
Table 1: Four Generations of Constitutional Perpetuities Bans
Clause States
"Perpetuities and monopolies are North Carolina (1776), Tennessee
contrary to the genius of a free state and (1796), Florida (1838, repealed 1868),
ought not to be allowed." Wyoming (1889)
"Perpetuities or monopolies are contrary Texas (1836), Arkansas (1874),
to the genius of a free government, and Oklahoma (1907)
shall not be allowed, nor shall the law of
primogeniture or entailments ever be in
force in this Republic."
"No perpetuities shall be allowed except California (1849, repealed 1970),
for eleemosynary purposes." Nevada (1864), Montana (1889)
"No hereditary emoluments, privileges, Arizona (1911)
or powers shall be granted or conferred,
and no law shall be enacted permitting
any perpetuity or entailment in this
State."
IV. PERPETUITIES As CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY
We are now in a position to consider the scope, purpose, and
policy of the state constitutional prohibitions of "perpetuities." Our aim
is to put these provisions in historical and functional context by looking
at the contemporaneous policy rhetoric and common law (a) as a general
matter, (b) in relation to the North Carolina provision, and (c) in
relation to the others.
A. Purposes and Policies
In proscribing "perpetuities," with that term understood to mean
property arrangements that create an unbarrable entail "in whatever
guise it appeared,"140 the framers of the state constitutions appear to
have had a functional problem in mind. Accordingly, to give content to
the proscription, it is useful to consider more closely the nature of that
functional problem. What is it about perpetuities that makes them
"contrary to the genius of a free state," warranting a constitutional
provision appearing alongside the right to due process and trial by
140. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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jury?14 1 The historical sources support three overlapping answers: (1)
ensuring marketable title, (2) protecting against changed
circumstances, and (3) avoiding concentrations of wealth and power.
1. Marketable Title
Numerous authorities contemporary to the 1776 North Carolina
Constitution denounce perpetuities on marketable title grounds. A
common view was that perpetuities "tend[ ] to put a stop to commerce,
and prevent the circulation of the property of the kingdom."1 42
Perpetuities "would be a bar to Industry and Commerce; the Cultivation
of Lands; and the Improvement of Estates: to which . . . a freedom of
charging or conveying Property is absolutely necessary."143 As such,
"the Law will not allow [property] to be tied up from alienation, that is
the Perpetuity which the Law abhors."14 4 This line of thinking can be
traced back to the Duke of Norfolk's Case, in which Lord Chancellor
Nottingham remarked that entails acted as "perpetual clogs upon the
estate." 145
2. Changed Circumstances
Another historical justification for limiting perpetuities is the
limits of foresight and the problem of changes in circumstances. Brian
Simpson put the point thus: "[G]iven that one can, to a limited extent only,
foresee the future and the problems it will generate, landowners hould
not be allowed to tie up lands for periods outside the range of reasonable
foresight."146 This strand of thought, too, traces back to the Duke of
Norfolk's Case. When asked, "Where will you stop, if you do not stop
141. See N.C. CoNST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. IX ("That no freeman shall be
convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in open
court, as heretofore used."); id. art. XXII ("That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed,
or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.").
142. 2 BURN & BURN, supra note 113, at 205; see also GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF
DEVISES, LAST WILLS, AND REVOCATIONS *118-19 (3d ed. 1773) ("Perpetuity, as it is a legal term
of art, is the limiting an estate either of inheritance, or for years, so as to render it unalienable
longer than for a life or lives in being at the same time, and some short or reasonable time after.
It is a thing odious in law and destructive to the commonwealth;-it would put a stop to the
commerce, and prevent the circulation of the property of the kingdom." (citations omitted)); 2
EDWARD WYNNE, EUNOMOS: OR, DIALOGUES CONCERNING THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF
ENGLAND 128-29 (London 1768) ("[Perpetuities] would be a bar to Industry and Commerce ... [to
which] a freedom of charging or conveying Property is absolutely necessary.").
143. 2 WYNNE, supra note 142, at 128-29.
144. Id. at 127.
145. (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.) 949; 3 Chan. Cas.1, 31.
146. A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 159-60 (1987).
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here?," Nottingham replied, "I will tell you where I will stop: I will stop
where-ever any visible Inconvenience doth appear."14 7
The role of perpetuities law in protecting against changed
circumstances was well recognized by 1776. Blackstone explained that
"courts of justice will not indulge even wills, so as to create a perpetuity,
which the law abhors: because by perpetuities . . . estates are made
incapable of answering those ends, of social commerce, and providing
for the sudden contingencies of private life, for which property was at
first established."14 8 Another contemporary treatise observed that "it is
against the nature of human affairs so to settle an estate in a family,
that on contingency or revolution of fortune the owner shall have no
power over it." 149
3. Concentrations of Wealth and Power
In the founding era, ownership of land came with political power.
As John Adams wrote, "[T]he Balance of Power in a Society,
accompanies the Balance of Property in Land. The only possible Way
then of preserving the Balance of Power on the side of equal Liberty and
public Virtue is to make the Acquisition of Land easy to every Member
of Society." 15 On this view, dynastic and aristocratic concentrations of
wealth (read: land) would lead to a kind of corruption of republican
political values.151 Accordingly, commentators writing around the time
of the North Carolina Constitution argued that perpetuities should be
banned to prevent such concentrations. The animating policy value was
liberty, not egalitarianism.
For example, a few years before the North Carolina
Constitution, one commentator wrote that perpetuities "are absolutely
inconsistent with the temper of a free Government by lodging too much
147. 22 Eng. Rep. at 960; 3 Chan. Cas. at 49.
148. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *174.
149. GILBERT, supra note 142, at 54 (emphasis omitted).
150. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
208, 210 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979).
151. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 182-84 (1992)
(discussing republican distaste for the pre-revolutionary "Patrician order" and the subsequent
post-revolutionary shift away from primogeniture and entail); Gregory S. Alexander, Time and
Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 294-96 (1991)
("Liberating land ... meant liberating the individual."). Tate points to evidence that some of the
delegates to the North Carolina constitutional convention were instructed specifically to "oppose
everything that leads to aristocracy." Tate, supra note 100, at 1829 (quotations and citations
omitted).
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power in a few individuals."152 A newspaper political commentary
published a few years later, in 1804, elaborates:
Is not an equal distribution of property, then essential to Republican freedom?
If you mean an equal distribution of property, on the principles of an Agrarian law, it is
not; for such distinction is unjust, it confounds the right of property, cuts the sinews of
industry, and gives power to those who will certainly abuse it. But, if by equal distribution
of property you mean a system of law to prevent perpetuities, and to brake down the
estates of deceased persons by dividing them out in equal portions to the heirs, it is. 15 3
As Gregory Alexander has explained:
[T]he device that American republican lawyers who despised English landed aristocracy
associated most closely with the landed English family dynasty was the entailment of
land.... American legal writers' republican concern for corruption prompted their hatred
of primogeniture and especially of entailments of land, which appeared to be the most
glaring vestiges of a corrupt past. 154
Sir Arthur Hobhouse long ago remarked that dead hand control
over the disposition of property sometimes reflects "motives of
reasonable prudence."155 In those cases, the policy concern is with
staleness arising from changes in circumstances. Other dead hand
control reflects "ambition[ ] or the love of power." 1 56 It is this latter kind
of dynastic impulse, involving concentration of wealth and power within
a family line, that is at issue here. The notion is that perpetuities are
antithetical to a free state because they lead to dynastic concentrations
of wealth and therefore of political power, threatening liberty.
152. 2 WYNNE, supra note 142, at 128.
153. From the Balance: Political Catechism, ALEXANDRIA DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar. 6, 1804, at
2.
154. Alexander, supra note 151, at 296, 298; see also SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN'S
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 55 (5th ed. 2011) (Opposition to the fee tail
"developed in the post-revolutionary era on the ground that it was incompatible with American
social conditions. This opposition arose ... partly from the employment of the fee tail in England
as a legal device to keep ancestral lands in the family for use as a basis of social and political
power."); Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 358, 394-96 (2006) (discussing "the belief that the vestiges
of feudalism-in particular, primogeniture and the entail, were incompatible with a republican
form of government"). The Framers' aversion to the "inequalities and dependencies of the feudal
system" is well-represented by John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law,
Bos. GAZETTE, Aug. 12, 1765, reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 111, 128 (R. Taylor, M.
Kline & G. Lint eds., 1977). Adams worried there was a "design on foot, to enslave all America,"
and to subvert "the whole system of our Fathers, by an introduction of the cannon and feudal law,
into America." Id. at 127.
155. Hobhouse, supra note 51, at 189.
156. Id. at 188.
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B. The North Carolina Constitution
Although commentators resisted perpetuities on the grounds of
alienability of land, changes in circumstances, and unjustified
concentrations of wealth and political power, it appears that the
framers of the North Carolina prohibition were concerned primarily
with unjustified concentration of wealth and political power.
To begin with, the text itself proscribes perpetuities because
they are "contrary to the genius of a free state."15 7 Like "perpetuity,"
"free state" was a term in common usage at the time. A free state was
one in which the people govern, in contrast to any form of despotic
regime.15 8 John Adams, for example, said that "there can be no
constitutional liberty, no free state, no right constitution of a
commonwealth, where the people are excluded from the
government."15 9 This distinction between a free state and despotism
appears also in work by Montesquieu, Blackstone, and other writers
with whom the drafters of state constitutions would have been
familiar. 160 By invoking the "free state," the framers were taking a
stand in favor of liberty and against aristocracy and unjustified
concentrations of power. The "genius" of a free state is that political
power is broadly distributed among the citizenry. 161
The statute passed by the state legislature in 1784 to implement
the state's constitutional directive to "regulate entails, in such a
manner as to prevent perpetuities" provides further evidence that the
North Carolina framers were concerned with unjustified concentration
of power. 162 Just as the First Judiciary Act informs our understanding
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution,163 North Carolina's Act of 1784 is
157. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII.
158. Eugene Volokh discusses this at length in connection with the Second Amendment's
reference to the "security of a free State" in Necessary to the Security of a Free State, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1 (2007), on which we have relied for the references discussed above.
159. See id. at 29 (quoting 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 361 (Philadelphia, William Cobbett 1797)).
160. See id.
161. Orth and Newby suggest hat "genius" here refers to "special character," ORTH & NEWBY,
supra note 11, at 90, which is consistent with its Latin origins. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, The
Genius of Charles Black, 111 YALE L.J. 1931 (2002) ("In Latin, the word genius refers to the
specialness of a person or place, its distinctive presiding spirit, the thing that makes it different
from all others-its own unique self. . . .").
162. See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see also John V. Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist
in North Carolina?, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 779 (1988) ('In 1784, the General Assembly
finally discharged its constitutional mandate and adopted the original of the statute still in force.").
163. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,
1219 (1988) ("[T]he Judiciary Act of 1789 ... is often viewed as a repository of insight into the
intended meaning of article III."); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 420 (1821) ("A
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suggestive about the likely meaning of "perpetuities" in the North
Carolina Constitution. The preamble to the relevant provision of that
Act, which transformed fee tails into fee simple, provided as follows:
[W]hereas entails of estates tends only to raise the wealth and importance of particular
families and individuals, giving them an unequal and undue influence in a republic, and
prove in manifold instances the source of great contention and injustice .... 16
Notice the specific indictment of perpetuities as giving families
"unequal and undue influence in a republic."165 Less than forty years
later, the state supreme court inferred from this language the purpose
of preventing the accumulation of individual wealth:
In obedience to the declaration of the Bill of Rights, and to the injunction in the
Constitution, the Legislature of 1784 abolished entails-giving as a reason that they
tended to raise the wealth and importance of particular families, and to give them an
undue influence in a republic. This shews plainly that they designed to prevent the
accumulation of individual wealth. 166
That the North Carolina constitutional proscription of
perpetuities is aimed at unjustified concentrations of wealth and power
is still further suggested by the connection between "perpetuities" and
"monopolies," as both are declared to be contrary to the genius of a free
state. 167 Monopolies were reviled by the Framers on republican political
(rather than efficiency) grounds. Madison, for example, said that a
government that lets "monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free
use of their faculties" is not a "just government" but "despotism."168
contemporaneous exposition of the constitution ... is the judiciary act itself. We know that in the
Congress which passed that act were many eminent members of the Convention which formed the
constitution.").
164. N.C. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § 5, reprinted in 24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 574
(W. Clark ed., 1905). Orth argues that the Act has not actually eliminated the fee tail in North
Carolina, at least as a future interest. See Orth, supra note 162, at 795 (stating that "it is
unwarranted to assert categorically that the fee tail does not exist in North Carolina").
165. Orth likewise connects this language to the phrase in the Declaration of Rights that
perpetuities are "contrary to the genius of a free state." Orth, supra note 9, at 402; see also Tate,
supra note 100, at 1834 ("Many of those who fought to free themselves from British colonial rule
were driven, at least in part, by a desire to strike out against familial influence, patronage,
hierarchy, and the other trappings of a hereditary aristocracy.").
166. Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. 96, 131 (1820).
167. See WOOD, supra note 151, at 187-88 (citing the North Carolina provision as an
illustration of republican distaste for "special privileges").
168. James Madison, Political Essay: Property, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
222, 224 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006). In 1787, George Mason refused to support the proposed new
federal Constitution in part because he thought the Necessary and Proper Clause would empower
Congress to "grant monopolies in trade and commerce." George Mason, Objections to the
Constitution, in 1 BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 132, 134
(Jon L. Wakelyn ed., 2004). Several state ratifying conventions likewise recommended an
amendment o bar federal grants of private monopolies. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry,
Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause As an Absolute
Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1150 & n.253.
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Madison also identified a common political thread between monopolies
and perpetuities. He wrote that the problem with monopolies is that the
benefit is "confined to one or a few," and that "[t]he evil of an excessive
& dangerous cumulation of landed property in the hands of individuals
is best precluded by the prohibition of entails, by the suppression of the
rights of primogeniture, and by the liability of landed property to the
payment of debts."169
C. The Other State Constitutions
As we have seen, the other ten state constitutional provisions
proscribing perpetuities appear to derive from the North Carolina
Constitution. 170 This common origin suggests a common purpose. To be
sure, the world changed between 1776 and 1911, when the last of these
constitutional provisions was adopted. But those changes strengthen
the case for these provisions being targeted at functional entails so as
to avoid unjustified concentrations of wealth and political power. Most
obviously, several of the constitutional bans on perpetuities were
adopted even after it became clear that the fee tail, the formal entail,
would not take root in America.17 1
Moreover, textual variations in the later constitutions point in
particular to anti-aristocratic worry about dynastic concentrations of
wealth. Four of the seven provisions that depart from the North
Carolina text include specific reference to the apparatus of the English
aristocracy, such as primogeniture and hereditary emoluments. 172 For
169. James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 745, 757 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1999). The connection between perpetuities and monopolies, and their tendency
toward concentrations of wealth and political power, can be traced back to the 1624 English
Statute of Monopolies, better known as the first patent statute. See ORTH & NEWBY, supra note
11, at 90. The language of the Statute of Monopolies, which proclaims that monopolies are
"altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, and so are and shall be utterly void and of none
effect," may have provided a model for the North Carolina prohibition. (1623-24) 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3
(Eng. & Wales), reprinted in THOMAS TURNER, THE LAW OF PATENTS AND REGISTRATION 115
(1851).
170. See supra Part III.
171. Alexander, supra note 151, at 297 ("[T]he institutions of primogeniture and the
entailment never really took root in American law."); Percy Bordwell, English Property Reform
and Its American Aspects, 37 YALE L.J. 179, 192 (1927) ("That the fee tail ever had any real vitality
in the United States, even in colonial times, may well be doubted."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 24.4 (2011) ("The fee tail estate is not
recognized in American Law.").
172. See supra Table 1 (Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Arizona). North Carolina's
Constitution bars hereditary emoluments in a separate provision, N.C. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, art. XXII ("[N]o hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors ought to be
granted or conferred in this State."), and the U.S. Constitution similarly forbids titles associated
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example, the Texas Constitution provides that perpetuities "shall not
be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in
force in this Republic."1 73 The Arizona Constitution says, "No hereditary
emoluments, privileges, or powers shall be granted or conferred, and no
law shall be enacted permitting any perpetuity or entailment in this
State."174 Because these provisions combine the bar on perpetuities
with other anti-aristocratic rules, it seems unlikely that they were
aimed merely at the problems of marketable title or changed
circumstances. Primogeniture in particular was commonly lumped
together with the entail in early American thought as twin evils that
"perpetuate an undesirable social and political class."17 5
The California provision, followed by Nevada and Montana, does
not add anti-aristocratic language, but it appears to have been
motivated by the same policy concern. When the California provision
was first introduced in convention, its sponsor explained its intended
purpose thus: "It is to prevent perpetuities of lands from families to
families. It is upon perpetuities that aristocracies are built up.
Democracy would soon be overturned if this was allowed."176 This bit of
legislative history would seem to confirm what the text and history
imply 177-namely, that the state constitutional bans on perpetuities
share not only common origins but also a common purpose. And that
purpose is to prevent unjustified, dynastic concentrations of wealth and
power by way of an entail, actual or functional.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERPETUAL TRUSTS
We have shown that the various state constitutional
prohibitions of "perpetuities" can be traced to the North Carolina
Constitution of 1776. We have also shown that these provisions share
the common purpose of proscribing entails, in form or function, to
with aristocracy, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States....").
173. TEX. CONST. of 1836, Declaration of Rights, § 17.
174. ARIz. CONST. of 1911, art. II, § 29.
175. Richard B. Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America, 27 COLUM. L. REV.
24, 32 (1927).
176. REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 129, at 272; see
also Robert H. Gerdes, supra note 9, at 92-93 (noting that this "quotation explains the evil that
the constitution framers desired to prevent and should be considered by the courts in interpreting
the meaning of the constitution").
177. Recall that the California provision finds its historical roots in the anti-aristocratic North
Carolina model, and that the provision excepts charities, which is a peculiar exception if the
primary purpose had been maintaining marketable title or protecting against changed
circumstances. See also infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
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prevent unjustified concentrations of wealth and power in the sense of
corrupting republican political values. We turn now to the practical
effect of these prohibitions.
The questions we consider are several: Do the constitutional
prohibitions of "perpetuities" require preservation of the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities? Or can the common law Rule be reformed?
If the latter, can the Rule be reformed to the extent of authorizing a
perpetual (or effectively perpetual) trust? If not, should courts in states
that have a constitutional ban on perpetuities refuse to enforce a
perpetual trust settled in another state on the grounds that such a trust
violates a strong public policy of the forum state?
Our answers to these questions focus on the purpose of the
constitutional prohibitions of "perpetuities," namely, banning entails,
whether in form or in function. The provisions were meant to guard
against the kinds of dynastic concentrations of wealth and political
power that were associated with English aristocracy. Accordingly, we
conclude that legislation authorizing perpetual or long-enduring
dynasty trusts is constitutionally suspect in a state with a
constitutional prohibition of perpetuities, but more modest reforms that
approximate the common law Rule are permissible. We also suggest
that the constitutional prohibitions reflect the kind of strong public
policy that would allow a court in a state with such a provision to refuse
to apply another state's law authorizing perpetual trusts.
A. USRAP and Other Reforms
"Today, every state has reformed the Rule in one way or
another."178 We therefore begin with the question of whether any reform
of the common law Rule, however modest, is permissible in a state with
a constitutional ban on perpetuities. If the bans are construed as
requiring Gray's canonical statement of the common law Rule, or as
freezing perpetuities law in its 1776 form, then reformation and wait-
and-see, and so USRAP, would be constitutionally suspect. Such a
construction would cast doubt on current practice in each of the nine
states with a constitutional perpetuities ban, as none retains the
traditional common law Rule.1 79
178. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 877; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS, ch. 27, intro. note ("Today, no state follows the common-
law Rule in its pure form.").
179. Arkansas and Montana have enacted USRAP, see An Act to Adopt the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, 2007 ARK. ACTS. 240 (2007) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-3-101
(2014)); Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 1989 MONT. LAWS, ch. 250 (1989) (codified
as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-1002 (2013), and Oklahoma and Texas have statutes
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None of the conventional modes of constitutional interpretation,
however, supports construing the prohibitions so narrowly. To begin
with, the text of the provisions bans "perpetuities" without specifying
particular implementing rules, which suggests some legislative
flexibility. 180 So does the further provision in the North Carolina
Constitution requiring "the future legislature ... [to] regulate entails,
in such a manner as to prevent perpetuities."181 All that is imperative
from the text is that "perpetuities" are proscribed. The constitutional
command is negative rather than positive; "perpetuities" are not
permitted, but no particular implementing rule is specified. 182
In historical context, "perpetuities" was a term of art that
referred to the entail "in whatever guise it appeared."183 As we have
seen, the common law of perpetuities was meant to overcome the
"ingenuity of conveyancers," who had tried to resurrect the entail by
way of a series of indestructible contingent future interests.184 The
common law of perpetuities, and the Rule Against Perpetuities that
emerged out of this law, was a means to that end. Other means might
be equal to the task, and indeed necessary, as lawyers devised new
forms of transfer. To be true to the teachings of history, future judges
and legislatures would need leeway to refashion the law of perpetuities
to cope with subsequently invented forms of transfer that might tend
toward a perpetuity.
It appears that Gray reached a similar conclusion. The burden
of his classic treatise was that the rule against remote vesting, and not
any of the other common law rules that policed perpetuities,185 was the
Rule Against Perpetuities. To Gray, therefore, the constitutional bans
on perpetuities were "simply pieces of declamation without juristic
permitting reformation, see 60 OKL. ST. ANN. § 75 (West 2014); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043
(West 2013). The remaining five states-North Carolina, Tennessee, Nevada, Wyoming, and
Arizona-authorize perpetual or effectively perpetual trusts. See infra note 203 (collecting
statutes).
180. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (concluding that, although a jury is
required, "the 12-man requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component" of that
guarantee).
181. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
182. Recall the analogy to the Thirteenth Amendment discussed in text accompanying supra
notes 105-108.
183. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
184. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
185. See Gerdes, supra note 9, at 87 ('It was the thesis of Mr. Gray's classic work ... that this
rule presently and always did require the vesting of estates within the prescribed period and did
not concern itself with the question of alienability."). The principal other common law rules dealing
with perpetuities are the rule against suspension of the power of alienation and the rule against
accumulations of income. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 912-17.
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value, at least on any question of remoteness."186 In context, what Gray
meant was that the provisions did not mandate his Rule Against
Perpetuities, that is, the common law rule against remote vesting.
However, he also pointed to cases that applied the provisions as positive
law,18 7 confirming that he understood the provisions to require a rule
against perpetuities.
Which brings us to the case law precedents. Although few in
number, the cases suggest three points germane to the present
question. 188 First, because the term "perpetuities" is undefined in the
state constitutions, courts have looked to the common law to give it
meaning. Franklin v. Armfield, decided by the Tennessee Supreme
Court in 1854, is illustrative: "[W]hat is the perpetuity that is not to be
allowed? The Constitution neither defines nor describes it; but assumes
that what it is is known. We are left, then, to enquire into the common
law for a proper understanding of the term."189 The court continued,
"[T]he reason of the rule against perpetuities and the reason of the
policy of the law . . . [is] to destroy the entailment of estates."190 Other
courts have construed the provisions similarly, looking to the common
law to give meaning to the term "perpetuities."191 Thus, in McLeod v.
Dell, the Florida Supreme Court held that judicial adoption of the
common law Rule was consistent with the state constitutional ban on
perpetuities, because "the convention which ordained that declaration,
are to be presumed to have understood the full import of the term
used."192
Second, consistent with McLeod, courts have suggested that, in
the absence of implementing legislation, a constitutional ban on
perpetuities is to be enforced by way of the common law Rule. In In re
McCray's Estate, the California Supreme Court took the view that "[t]he
rule against perpetuities" was "ingrafted upon our system by the [state]
186. GRAY, supra note 12, § 730, at 670.
187. Id. § 730, at 670 n.8; id. § 731, at 670-71 nn.1-2; see also id. § 752, at 692-93.
188. A fourth point from the cases is that the constitutional bans that do not expressly exempt
charities, such as the North Carolina provision, nonetheless do not pertain to charitable gifts. See
infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
189. 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 305, 353 (1854).
190. Id. at 354.
191. See Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457, 472 (1881) (en banc) ("In the absence of any
legislation adopting the common law, it is probable that the courts of this State would go to the
common law definitions to ascertain the meaning of the expression 'no perpetuities shall be
allowed,' as used in the Constitution."); Eager v. McCoy, 228 S.W. 709, 711 (Tenn. 1921) ("[T]he
Constitution does not define perpetuities, and we must look to the common law for the proper
meaning of the term."); City of Chattanooga v. Tenn. Elec. Power Co., 112 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Tenn.
1938) (following Eager, looking to the common law to resolve a question under the constitutional
ban).
192. 9 Fla. 427, 447 (1861).
2014] 1805
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Constitution."193 In Melcher v. Camp, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the common law Rule had been in existence in that state "from
the ratification" of the state constitution, which bans "perpetuities."194
In Broach v. City of Hampton, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained
that, because the state constitution "forbids perpetuities" but the state
"does not have a statute stating the rule against perpetuities," the state
"follows the common law rule."195 Perhaps even more on point, in In re
Gay's Estate and Mcllvain v. Hockaday, the California Supreme Court
and a Texas appellate court each held a bequest that would create a
perpetual trust to be invalid as a violation of the respective states'
constitutional bans on perpetuities.196
Third, a constitutional ban on perpetuities may be satisfied
otherwise than by the common law Rule, provided that the
constitutional policy is still honored. In Estate of Hinckley, the
California Supreme Court put the point as follows: "It can not seriously
be contended that this provision of the Constitution either prevents the
Legislature from shortening the period within which estates must vest,
or from making the law thus shortening such period applicable to trusts
for charitable uses."197 A later decision, In re Sahlender's Estate (1948),
elaborated thus: "The framers were careful not to adopt any specific
'rule,' but to provide that 'perpetuities' were prohibited. . . . [I]t would
seem to follow logically . .. that the Legislature could regulate the rules
as the needs of the times might require."19 8
In view of the relevant text, history, and precedents, we conclude
that modest reform of the common law Rule, such as reformation and
wait-and-see, is constitutional. 199 These reforms do nothing to extend
the duration of a settlor's control over property. Rather, they soften the
what-might-happen test of the common law Rule to respect the settlor's
intent as much as possible within the conventional perpetuities period
of lives in being plus twenty-one years.200 In a similar vein, because
USRAP's ninety-year wait-and-see period approximates, rather than
upends, the Rule's limit on dead hand control, it is consistent with the
193. 268 P. 647, 650 (Cal. 1928).
194. 435 P.2d 107, 112 (Okla. 1967).
195. 677 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Ark. 1984).
196. 71 P. 707, 708 (Cal. 1903); Mcllvain v. Hockaday, 81 S.W. 54, 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
197. 58 Cal. 457, 472 (1881) (en banc).
198. Anglo Cal. Nat'1 Bank of S.F. v. Raithel (In re Sahlender's Estate), 201 P.2d 69, 75 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
199. Lynn Foster reached the same conclusion with respect to Arkansas's adoption ofUSRAP.
Foster, supra note 9, at 461-62 ("Can the legislature validly enact a statutory version of the Rule?
Almost certainly, yes.").
200. See supra Part II.B.2-3 (discussing these reforms).
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constitutional policy. 201 The same is true for the two-generation
perpetuities rule of the Restatement (Third) of Property.202 Because
none of these reforms has the purpose or effect of allowing the
functional entailment of property through a perpetual string of life
estates, none is inconsistent with the policy of the constitutional bans
on perpetuities.
B. Perpetual Trust Statutes
Five of the nine states with constitutional prohibitions on
perpetuities have gone further than mere reform of the common law
Rule. They have enacted statutes that purport to authorize perpetual
or long-enduring dynasty trusts.203 Because these statutes permit
entailment of property down the generations by way of a string of
perpetual (or effectively perpetual) life estates, they are constitutionally
suspect in a state with a constitutional ban on perpetuities.
1. Resurrecting the Entail and Concentration of Wealth
Recall the prototypical perpetual trust sketched earlier: 0 funds
a trust with her transfer-tax exemption amount,204 to pay the income to
her daughter, A, for life. 205 The trust instrument gives A the power to
appoint the trust corpus outright or in further trust to such of O's
descendants, other than herself (to avoid ownership equivalence for tax
and creditor purposeS206), as A names by deed or by will. On A's death,
the remainder not appointed by A is to be held in separate share trusts
201. Cf. Rich, Rich & Nance v. Carolina Constr. Corp., 558 S.E.2d 77, 79-80 (N.C. 2002)
(taking notice of legislative adoption of USRAP, excluding "nondonative transfers," in spite of the
constitutional ban).
202. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the new Restatement rule).
203. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901(A)(3) (2014) (exempting trusts from the Rule); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.1031(1)(b) (Lexis-Nexis 2013) (365 years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-23(h) (2013)
(same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-202(f) (2014) (extending the perpetuities period to 360 years);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-139(b) (2014) (1,000 years).
204. The exemption amount can be leveraged with life insurance or other assets likely to
appreciate, making it more valuable than its face amount. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note (2011); Goodwin, supra note 15, at 489-
97. Another common strategy is to obtain valuation discounts for lack of marketability and control
by way of a family limited partnership or otherwise. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at
950-52.
205. See supra Part II.C.3. As indicated there, this example is based on NENNO, supra note
93, at 333-47.
206. A power to appoint to oneself is an ownership-equivalent power, which would bring the
property into A's taxable estate and subject it to claims by A's creditors. See DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 800-04.
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for each of A's children, subject to the same terms, thus restarting the
cycle.
Although in this example each generation may bring an end to
the trust by appointing the trust property to the next generation
outright rather than in further trust, the next generation cannot compel
the prior generation to do so. Such a power is dynastic, as it limits
consumption by the current generation, forcing the property down the
line of descent.207 Moreover, this power of appointment is a feature of
the trust, as sketched out here, in accordance with standard formbook
language.208 Such a power is not required. To the contrary, in a state
that has authorized perpetual trusts, 0 could create a trust for lifetime
benefit of each successive generation in perpetuity, with no power in
anyone to terminate the trust or change the order of succession-an
entail.209
Recall Blackstone's description of a perpetuity: "[T]he
settlement of an interest, which shall go in the succession prescribed,
without any power of alienation."2 10 By enabling a donor to create an
inalienable string of beneficial life estates "to which the device of
common recovery [cannot] be applied,"211 the perpetual trust statutes
have resurrected the entail in a new guise. The Restatement (Third) of
Property explains:
A perpetual or centuries-long trust has a strong similarity to the fee tail estate, and might
be called an equitable fee tail. Such trusts typically provide that trust income, after the
settlor's death, is to be paid, or in the discretion of the trustee is to be paid, to the settlor's
issue living from time to time forever or for several hundred years, i.e., the equivalent or
substantial equivalent of a continuum of successive life estates in income.2 12
Because the perpetual trust statutes run counter to the longstanding
common law tradition of opposing "the evolution, under some newer
guise, of any form of perpetual unbarrable entail," 213 they run counter
to the core policy value of the constitutional bans on perpetuities. The
constitutional bans were meant to proscribe any form of transfer that
amounts to a perpetual entailment of property down the generations.
207. A point recognized by traditional perpetuities law. See supra note 96.
208. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
209. Even those who defend perpetual trusts on the grounds that powers of appointment are
not unusual" concede that, under the statutes, a perpetual trust can be drafted to "last forever,"
without such a power in anyone. Crawford, supra note 97, at 86-87.
210. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 24.4 cmt. c
(2011); see also Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 421-23 (2005) (arguing
that modern "dynasty trusts" recreate the fee tail).
213. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
1808 [Vol. 67:6:1769
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PERPETUAL TRUSTS
That a perpetual trust can include a spendthrift provision is an
aggravating factor. American trust law recognizes the enforceability of
a spendthrift provision, which is a disabling restraint imposed by the
settlor that prevents voluntary or involuntary alienation of a beneficial
interest.214 Spendthrift provisions are routinely included in
professionally drafted trusts, if only by rote inclusion of formbook
boilerplate, and a growing number of states make trusts spendthrift by
default.215 A spendthrift provision in a perpetual trust prevents
voluntary or involuntary alienation of the successive beneficial
interests, forever.
The historical sources support three overlapping functional
rationales for the constitutional bans on perpetuities: (1) ensuring
marketable title, (2) protecting against changed circumstances, and (3)
avoiding concentrations of wealth and power, with the third being
paramount for the framers of the bans.216 The framers' worry was the
kind of dynastic concentration of wealth and political power that was
associated with English aristocracy. Yet both champions and critics of
perpetual trusts, which tellingly are marketed as "dynasty trusts,"
agree that their primary purpose is concentration and protection of
family wealth.
Critics, such as Professor Ray Madoff, argue that perpetual
spendthrift trusts will "creat[e] a new aristocracy made up of
individuals who have access to large amounts of untaxed wealth to meet
their every need and desire while being immune from the claims of
creditors."217 Supporters make a similar point, albeit from a different
perspective. Proponents of perpetual dynasty trusts in Nevada, for
example, claimed that they were creating a "fantasy world" in which
assets may be held and protected "for your descendants forever!"218
Across the country, a "heavily promoted" reason for creating a perpetual
dynasty trust is "the ability to protect family wealth from beneficiaries'
bad judgment or misfortune."219
214. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 694-97.
215. See JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE GUIDE TO TRUSTS AND TRUST
ADMINISTRATION tbl.5, pt. 1 (2012).
216. See supra Part IV.
217. MADOFF, supra note 2, at 76; see also Ray D. Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A19 (arguing that perpetual trusts "enable affluent people to provide their
heirs with money and property largely free from taxes and immune to the claims of creditors... for
generations in perpetuity-truly creating an American aristocracy").
218. Oshins & Ruud, supra note 16, at 18.




Yet as we have seen, allowing a donor to concentrate wealth
within her family down the generations by prescribing a fixed order of
succession to a perpetual string of life estates, as permitted by the
perpetual trust statutes, is precisely what the framers of the
constitutional prohibitions meant to proscribe.220 Consider again two
pieces of the myriad evidence adduced earlier. First, in implementation
of the state constitutional directive to "prevent perpetuities," in 1784
the North Carolina legislature transformed fee tails into fee simple on
the reasoning that entails give particular families "unequal and undue
influence in a republic." 2 2 1 The problem with perpetuities, in other
words, is that they tend toward unjustified concentration of power
inconsistent with a "free state." Second, when the California ban was
first introduced in convention, its sponsor explained: "It is to prevent
perpetuity of lands from families to families. It is upon perpetuities that
aristocracies are built up. Democracy would soon be overturned if this
was allowed."222
Our analysis finds a supportive analogy in Succession of
Lauga.223 At issue in that case, decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in 1993, was a state constitutional provision that "[n]o law shall be
passed abolishing forced heirship,"22 4 meaning that state's mandatory
inheritance for descendants. In the teeth of this provision, the
legislature passed a statute limiting forced heirship to incompetent
descendants and those under the age of twenty-three. Reasoning that
the statute "promotes the very evils that the forced heirship guarantee
was designed to combat," including "the concentration of family estates
in fewer than all the children" and so "excessive concentrations of
wealth," the court held that the statute was unconstitutional.2 25
2. A Contrary Precedent?
Thus far there is only one reported appellate decision on the
constitutionality of a contemporary perpetual trust statute in a state
that has a constitutional ban on perpetuities. That case, Brown
Brothers Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, decided in 2010 by an
220. See supra Part IV.
221. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
222. REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 129, at 272; see
also Gerdes, supra note 9, at 92-93 (noting that this "quotation explains the evil that the
constitution framers desired to prevent and should be considered by the courts in interpreting the
meaning of the constitution").
223. 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
224. Id. at 1158 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. The state constitution was subsequently amended to allow for the reform. See LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 5, amended by 1995 La. Acts 1321.
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intermediate appellate court in North Carolina, upheld the state's
perpetual trust statute against constitutional challenge.226 Because the
holding in Benson only pertains to a narrow slice of the broader
question, and because its analysis of the constitutional provision is
deeply flawed, it should not be followed by the North Carolina Supreme
Court or by courts in other states.227
The perpetual trust at issue in Benson was settled in North
Carolina three months after the state repealed its Rule Against
Perpetuities. The litigation was initiated by the trustee after some of
the beneficiaries questioned the constitutionality of the repeal and so
the validity of the trust.228 As in many of the perpetual trust states,229
the North Carolina statute allows for a perpetual trust if the trustee
has the power to sell the trust property230-in the jargon, if the trust
does not suspend the trustee's power of alienation.231 This requirement
answers the marketability problem, in that the trust property is not
removed from commerce, but it does not address the problem of changes
in circumstances in relation to the administrative structure of the trust
or its dispositive provisions, nor does it address the concern about
concentration of wealth.232
The beneficiaries took the position that the common law Rule
was mandated by the state constitution.233 The court therefore framed
the case thus: "The sole issue before the Court in this case is whether
the North Carolina Constitution requires application of the common
law rule against perpetuities' restriction of the remote vesting of future
interests in property. We conclude that it does not."234 On this narrow
point, the court was surely correct. As we have seen, the relevant text,
history, and precedents all suggest hat the state constitutional bans on
perpetuities may be satisfied otherwise than by the common law Rule,
hence modest reform, such as reformation and wait-and-see, is
constitutional.235 The beneficiaries' position would render
226. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson (Benson), 688 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App.
2010).
227. John Orth reminds us that the North Carolina Supreme Court declined twice to review
the appellate court's decision. See Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 703 S.E.2d 157
(N.C. 2010); Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, 698 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 2010).
228. Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 753-52.
229. See supra note 87.
230. Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 753 n.1.
231. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 912.
232. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1321.
233. Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 754.
234. Id. at 753.
235. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional those reforms, such as under USRAP, which casts
doubt on the tenability of their argument.236
So the court was correct to answer the "sole issue" before it,
whether the state constitution "requires application of the common law
rule," in the negative. But in further exposition, the court went on to
say that the statute at issue satisfies the "constitutional prohibition of
perpetuities because it provides a mechanism for preventing
unreasonable restraints on alienation."237 The court continued, "Rather
than addressing alienability of property indirectly by regulating the
vesting of remote interests, as does the common law rule, [the statute]
directly preserves alienability of property by prohibiting suspension of
the power of alienation."238 This further exposition, arguably dicta
because it was unnecessary to answer the "sole issue" before the court,
is contrary to the constitutional provision's text, history, purpose, and
precedents.
Conceding that "the historical definition of the term [perpetuity]
is the most relevant," the court concluded without citation to contextual
historical evidence that the constitutional "prohibition prohibits
unreasonable restraints on alienation."239 To be sure, alienability has
loomed as a significant consideration in what constitutes a perpetuity.
But in the words of the distinguished legal historian Brian Simpson, in
context the term perpetuity "meant an unbarrable entail, in whatever
guise it appeared."240 The abundant evidence canvassed earlier, almost
none of which was brought to the court's attention by the briefs on
appeal, points strongly to the conclusion that the term "perpetuity" as
used in the state constitutions means an entail, in function or in form,
with reference to alienability of beneficial ownership, not merely
alienability of the underlying property. The court failed, in other words,
to attend to the bifurcation of legal and equitable or beneficial
ownership that is the "hallmark characteristic" of a donative trust.241
What makes a perpetual trust the latest guise of an unbarrable entail
is that it can be used to create a perpetual string of inalienable
beneficial interests down the generations.
236. Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 756. The beneficiaries' argument would also invalidate exclusion
of nondonative transfers from the Rule, as under USRAP § 4(1), which was implicitly upheld in
Rich, Rich & Nance v. Carolina Constr. Corp., 558 S.E.2d 77, 79-80 (N.C. 2002).
237. Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 757.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
241. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 393.
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The judges in Benson, who appear to have been unfamiliar with
the history of perpetuities,242 were persuaded by the argument of the
trustee that, "[u]nlike entails and fee tails, dynasty trusts do not tie up
property in one family for generations so long as the trustee has power
to sell the trust property."243 But this argument does not come to grips
with the point that a dynasty trust is an equitable fee tail in which the
settlor can mandate the order of succession for a perpetual string of
inalienable beneficial interests. In effect, the court collapsed the Rule
Against Perpetuities into the more narrow rule against suspension of
the power of alienation.244 Yet in the court's words, "[c]onstitutional
provisions should be construed in consonance with the objects and
purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption."245 The court's
focus on alienability of the trust property obscured the other "objects
and purposes" of the perpetuities bans, such as the problem of changed
circumstances. In Blackstone's words, "by perpetuities ... estates are
made incapable of . .. providing for the sudden contingencies of private
life," 246 a problem not solved as regards the administrative and
dispositive structure of a trust by giving the trustee the power to sell
the trust property.247
Still another policy worry underpinning the law of perpetuities,
probably dominant in motivating the constitutional bans, was
preventing unjustified concentrations of wealth.248 In Benson, the court
quoted an earlier decision of the state supreme court, Griffin v.
Graham, for the proposition that a perpetuity is "an estate tail so
settled that it cannot be undone or made void."2 49 But in a further
242. For example, the court referred to the period of the rule as "an arbitrary stopping point,"
Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 756, without regard for the deeply principled know-and-see basis for lives
in being plus twenty-one years. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
243. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 16, Benson, 688 S.E.2d 752 (No. COA-09-474); see also id. at
21 ("So long as a trustee is free to transfer title to the property owned by the trust, there is no
constitutionally prohibited restraint on alienation.").
244. See Orth, supra note 9, at 403-07; see also Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank of S.F. v. Raithel (In re
Sahlender's Estate), 201 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (distinguishing the Rule Against
Perpetuities (i.e., the rule against remote vesting), enshrined by the state constitution, from the
rule against suspension of the power of alienation); Gerdes, supra note 9, at 96-100 (discussing
remoteness of vesting, suspension of the power of alienation, and the state constitutional bans).
245. 688 S.E.2d at 754 (quoting State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 509 (N.C. 2004)).
246. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
247. Commentators have suggested that liberalization of trust modification and termination
rules may be required in light of the rise of perpetual trusts. See, e.g., RONALD CHESTER, FROM
HERE TO ETERNITY? 53-58 (2007) (suggesting that "modification and termination will be the key
issue for trust law in the 21st century ... in light of the decline in importance of the Rule Against
Perpetuities").
248. See supra Part IV.A.3.
249. 688 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 96, 130-32 (1820)).
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passage, which was elided by the appellate court in Benson with an
ellipsis, the supreme court in Griffin reviewed historical evidence
showing that perpetuities, meaning entails, were banned because they
"tended to raise the wealth and importance of particular families, and
to give them an undue influence in the republic." 250 Like the concern
about changes in circumstances, worry about concentration of wealth
pertains to the alienability of the beneficial interest, not the alienability
of the underlying property.
The particulars of Griffin, unremarked upon by the court in
Benson, are instructive. The question presented in Griffin was whether
the constitutional ban on perpetuities applied to a charitable gift. The
supreme court held in the negative, reasoning that a charitable gift does
not give rise to the "evil" of concentrating "wealth and importance" in
"particular families." 251 The court said that the constitutional ban "did
not contemplate the possibility of any evil likely to arise from the
establishment of a permanent fund for charitable uses."252 To the
contrary, the "probable effect of' the gift "was the reverse of what" the
ban was "meant to guard against, as it promised to increase the equality
of the republic." 253 The court took notice of the fact that the charitable
fiduciaries, "like other trustees, may sell for a valuable consideration,"
but it did not resolve the case on the grounds that the gift did not
suspend the fiduciary's power of alienation.254 If the court in Griffin had
adopted the same reasoning as the court in Benson, there would have
been no need to consider whether a charitable gift could give rise to the
evil of concentrating wealth.
In sum, the centerpiece of the court's reasoning in Benson was
that, by insisting that the trustee have the power to sell the trust
property, the state perpetual trust statute "provides a mechanism for
preventing unreasonable restraints on alienation."255 But this is a
narrow, ahistorical understanding of the "objects and purposes" of the
constitutional ban and of the meaning of the term "perpetuity." A
perpetual trust is an equitable fee tail, a perpetual string of inalienable
equitable life estates, which is an unbarrable entail in a new guise-
precisely what the framers of the bans sought to proscribe.
250. Griffin, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) at 131.
251. Id.
252. Id.; see also State v. McGowen, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 9, 15-16 (1841) (following Griffin);
Franklin v. Armfield, 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 305, 353-58 (1854) (same).
253. Griffin, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) at 131.
254. Id. at 132.
255. Benson, 688 S.E.2d at 757.
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3. Plausibility and Tax Policy
In accordance with the historical sources, we have emphasized
the purpose of avoiding dynastic concentrations of wealth and power
such as was associated with English aristocracy. It is not obvious,
however, that a string of inalienable equitable life estates by way of a
perpetual trust will in fact concentrate wealth and power in individual
families, or that if so, a rule against remote vesting of interests is the
right instrument of policy for dealing with the externalities of such
concentrations.
To begin with, as Jonathan Macey has observed, "[U]nless
trustees systematically are able to invest trust accumulations so as to
outperform all other investments, there is no reason that permitting
such accumulations will allow wealth to become more concentrated."256
And trustees do not have systematically better information than other
investors in fiercely competitive capital markets. Moreover, as one of us
has argued elsewhere, "even after the recent modernization of trust
investment law, as compared to outright ownership the trust form
carries with it additional agency costs, an extra layer of fees and
commissions, and higher rates of federal income taxation. Each of these
factors imposes drag on trust fund performance."257
A further dissipating factor will be the proliferation of
beneficiaries down the generations. In only 150 years, not so much
longer than a trust could endure under traditional law, "a perpetual
trust could have about 450 living beneficiaries; after 250 years, more
than 7,000 living beneficiaries."258 We are doubtful that "any
investment program could produce a matching geometric growth in
trust corpus, especially if the current beneficiaries make demands on
the trust income."259
To make administration feasible, a perpetual trust with
proliferating beneficiaries likely will require periodic division into
256. Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295,
311 (1988).
257. Sitkoff, supra note 47, at 514; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 136-39 (2009).
258. Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts (Univ. of
Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 259, 2014) [hereinafter
Waggoner, From Here to Eternity]; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization
of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1657 n. 126 (2014).
259. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 903. For analysis, see Lucy A. Marsh, The
Demise of Dynasty Trusts: Returning the Wealth to the Family, 5 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP.
L.J. 23 (2012); William J. Turnier & Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Malthusian Analysis of the So-Called
Dynasty Trust, 28 VA. TAx REV. 779 (2009). No matter how broad a trustee's discretion in
distributions, the trustee's exercise (or nonexercise) of that discretion is always subject to review
by a court. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 610-11.
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multiple separate trusts.260 After enough divisions, the trusts likely will
be small enough to warrant termination on grounds of inefficiency.261
Moreover, after a few generations, and so a few divisions of the trust, it
will be incoherent to speak of all the disparate beneficiaries of the
original trust as belonging to the same family. If one goes back far
enough, one can find a common ancestor for President Barack Obama
and President George W. Bush.262 But it would be peculiar to speak of
them as belonging to the same family.
Even if these suppositions are wrong, and perpetual dynasty
trusts do wind up concentrating wealth and power in particular
families, progressive income and transfer taxation is a more apt policy
instrument for dealing with the resulting externalities than the Rule
Against Perpetuities.263 Here we are making two claims, one of
tightness of fit and the other of political reality. Income and transfer
taxes are more direct, allow for finer calibration, and are of broader
application than the Rule. The richest Americans today increasingly
trace their wealth not to inheritance but to the application of their
human capital in scalable industries such as technology and finance.264
Moreover, if set at the federal level, income and transfer taxes won't
unravel, as did the Rule, in a jurisdictional competition among the
states.265 The political reality is that "Congress has come to be in charge
of trust duration."266 Or as one of us put the point elsewhere, "debate
260. The power to divide a trust is familiar boilerplate, as in NENNO, supra note 93, at 339; is
provided by UNIF. TRUST CODE § 417 (amended 2010); and is recognized as a matter of common
law by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 68 (2003).
261. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. d (2003).
262. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity, supra note 258, at 7; Lawrence W. Waggoner, US
Perpetual Trusts, 127 L.Q. REV. 423, 426-27 (2011).
263. See Wojciech Kopczuk, Economics of Estate Taxation: Review of Theory and Evidence, 63
TAX L. REV. 139, 151-53 (2009) ("This brings me to what I think is the strongest argument for
considering estate taxation: the possibility of externalities from wealth concentration."); see also
Leach, supra note 56, at 727 ("Graduated estate and income taxes have largely eliminated any
threat to the public welfare from family dynasties built either on great landed estates or on great
capital wealth.").
264. See Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, It's the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the
Return to Top Talent, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 35, 36; see also Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
265. Federal wealth transfer taxation is, however, subject to its own political pathologies. See,
e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH (2006).
266. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 1343; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress
Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why? 10 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 349, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/absrtact=2326524, archived at
http://perma.cc/4U5P-NJ35 (arguing that "primary responsibility [for perpetual trusts] rests with
Congress"). The Treasury Department has proposed levying a periodic tax on perpetual trusts. See
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR
2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 164-65 (2014).
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over the principle of freedom of disposition, and its role in perpetuating
inequalities of wealth, has become a question of federal tax policy." 267
To be clear, our questioning of whether perpetual trusts will in
fact concentrate wealth and, if so, whether a rule against remote vesting
is the right policy instrument to address the matter, does not
undermine our principal conclusion that the statutes authorizing
perpetual trusts are unconstitutional in the states with a constitutional
ban on perpetuities. Those bans give constitutional status to the
longstanding common law policy against entails, whether in form or in
function. The modern perpetual trust is an equitable fee tail, allowing
for a perpetual string of inalienable life estates, hence it is the latest
guise in which the unbarrable entail has appeared.
C. Perpetual Trusts Settled in Another State
The jurisdictional competition for perpetual trust funds depends
on a particular backdrop choice-of-law rule. The assumption is that for
a trust funded with liquid financial assets, naming a trustee located in
another state and giving that trustee custody of the trust fund is enough
to ensure that courts will enforce a provision in the trust specifying that
the law of that state is to govern the validity and administration of the
trust.268 Some perpetual trust states provide for this outcome expressly
by statute, as does the Uniform Trust Code.269 The common law is in
accord, as the presence of the trustee and the trust funds in the chosen
state provides a "substantial relation" between the trust and the
state.270
But the constitutional perpetuities bans introduce a
complicating wrinkle. Prevailing conflict-of-laws doctrine allows a court
to refuse to apply foreign law that violates a "strong public policy of the
forum" state.271 "Invoking the concept of 'public policy,' a court can
refuse to enforce, as contrary to its own notions of justice and fairness,
a rule found in the state designated by the forum's choice-of-law
rule."2 72 This public policy backstop applies to trusts and estates
267. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 920.
268. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) (1971).
271. Id. § 90; see also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEx. L. REV. 921, 934-44 (1998) (surveying the public policy exception in conflict of laws).
272. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1, at 81 (3d ed.
1986).
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matters, including a settlor's choice of law to govern the validity of a
trust. 273
Accordingly, if a dispute relating to an out-of-state perpetual
trust were to be litigated in a state with a constitutional ban on
perpetuities, the courts of the forum state would be confronted with the
question of whether the forum state's constitutional ban reflects the
kind of strong public policy warranting a refusal to apply the other
state's law authorizing perpetual trusts.274 The possibility of such a case
is not fanciful. For example, the courts of the state where a person is
domiciled or resides might be asked to pass on the validity of an out-of-
state trust in computing a surviving spouse's forced share or in a divorce
proceeding (albeit with a personal jurisdiction limit 2 75). In such a case,
the question would be whether, in the words of Justice Cardozo, the
constitutional bans tate a strong public policy such that enforcing the
perpetual trust statute of another state "would violate some
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270(a) ("An inter vivos trust of
interests in movables is valid if valid. . . under the local law of the state designated by the settlor
to govern the validity of the trust, provided that this state has a substantial relation to the trust
and that the application of its law does not violate a strong public policy of the state with which, as
to the matter at issue, the trust has its most significant relationship." (emphasis added)). The
principle has been codified by UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107(1) (amended 2010) ("The meaning and
effect of the terms of a trust are determined by[ ] . . . the law of the jurisdiction designated in the
terms unless the designation of that jurisdiction's law is contrary to a strong public policy of the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue . . . .").
274. See Jonathan D. Blattmachr et al., Avoiding the Adverse Effects of Huber, TR. & EST.,
July 2013, at 20, 22 (raising the possibility "that a Texan ... couldn't create a perpetual trust in
another state" because "the policy in Texas against perpetual trusts is contained in its state
constitution").
275. A court can issue a binding order on a trustee only if it has personal jurisdiction over the
trustee, which might not be the case for an out-of-state trust. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum,
Reaching for the Sky-Or Pie in the Sky: Is U.S. Onshore Trust Reform an Illusion?, in EXTENDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 291, 300 (David Hayton ed., 2002)
("[T]he ultimate question is whether the local court will be able to exercise jurisdiction over the
out-of-state trust or the foreign trustee."); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's
Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1089 (2000) (noting that a litigant challenging the
validity of an out-of-state trust "must still obtain a forum state judgment that will be effective
against either the trustee or the trust property"); cf Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
(holding that the Florida court that probated decedent's will lacked jurisdiction over the trustee of
a Delaware inter vivos trust). But even if a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a foreign trustee,
it may consider the fact of the trust assets in reckoning the value of a marital estate in a divorce
proceeding or of a decedent's estate in computing a surviving spouse's elective share, and it may
issue an order for subsequent enforcement in a court that does have personal jurisdiction over the
trustee. See, e.g., Riechers v. Riechers, 679 N.Y. S.2d 233, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1998) ("While the ultimate
determination of the entitlement to the corpus of the trust remains with the high court of Cook
Islands, this court awards to the plaintiff one half of the value of the marital assets placed in the
Cook Islands trust. .. ." (emphasis omitted)), affd, 701 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."2 76
Although the issue has yet to be litigated, other conflict-of-laws
cases involving trusts and estates suggest "there is a real possibility
that" a forum state with a constitutional ban will refuse to enforce an
out-of-state perpetual trust.277 One analogy is to the spousal forced
share.278 Some courts have refused to enforce a choice-of-law provision
in a decedent's will that would defeat the forced share of the decedent's
domicile at death.279 Another analogy is to self-settled asset protection
trusts.280 A small but growing case law has refused enforcement of such
a trust settled in another state on public policy grounds.281
In harmony with our conclusion that reformation and wait-and-
see do not violate the state constitutional bans on perpetuities, courts
have upheld trusts under out-of-state perpetuities law that is more
forgiving than the forum state's law. 282 The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws deduces from these cases the principle that differences
in perpetuities law do not fall within the public policy exception.283 As
Judge Posner has observed, "[O]bviously the mere fact that foreign and
domestic law differ on some point is not enough to invoke the exception.
276. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
277. Schoenblum, supra note 275, at 299.
278. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 512-36.
279. Compare Clare v. Clark (In re Estate of Clark), 236 N.E.2d 152, 158 (N.Y. 1968)
("Virginia's overwhelming interest in the protection of surviving spouses domiciled there demands
that we apply its law to give the widow in this case the right of election provided for her under
that law."), with Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Bos. v. Cumming, 91 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Mass. 1950)
(honoring choice of Massachusetts law for Vermont domiciliary, notwithstanding that doing so
defeated widow's elective share under Vermont law). See also Christopher P. Cline, Jeffrey N.
Pennell & Terry L. Turnipseed, Spouse's Elective Share, 841 Tax Mgmt. Estate, Gifts, & Trusts
Portfolios (BNA) No. 841, at A-31 (2012) (discussing choice of law for the elective share).
280. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 4, at 703-14.
281. See Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013)
(reasoning that, because "Washington has a policy that a debtor should not be able to escape the
claims of his creditors by utilizing a spendthrift trust," the court would "disregard the settlor's
choice of Alaska law, which is obviously more favorable to him, and will apply Washington law in
determining the Trustee's claim regarding validity of the Trust"); see also Sattin v. Brooks (In re
Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101-02 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (refusing to apply foreign law authorizing
spendthrift trust in part "on the basis of public policy considerations"); Marine Midland Bank v.
Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Portnoy may not unilaterally
remove the characterization of property as his simply by incorporating a favorable choice of law
provision into a self-settled trust of which he is the primary beneficiary."); Ronald Mann, Assessing
the Race to the Bottom with State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1741 (2014).
282. See Cross v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 30 N.E. 125 (N.Y. 1892) (perpetuities); see also
Whitney v. Dodge, 38 P. 636 (Cal. 1894) (restraints on alienation); Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 9
N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1937) (accumulations).
283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269 cmt. g (1971); id. § 270 cmt. d.
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Otherwise in every case of an actual conflict the court of the forum state
would choose its own law; there would be no law of conflict of laws."284
But the question of whether a constitutional ban on perpetuities
reflects the kind of strong public policy that would warrant refusal to
apply another state's law authorizing perpetual trusts is meaningfully
different in two respects. First, giving effect to another state's
perpetuities reform, such as wait-and-see, that has not been adopted in
the forum state is only to respect another state's subtly different
implementation of the same basic public policy. To give effect to another
state's repeal of the rule, by contrast, is to deny the forum state's
contrary public policy as enshrined in the state constitution.
Second, that the forum state's policy is mandated by the state
constitution-in this case a proscription of something that some of the
provisions characterize as "contrary to the genius of a free state"285
implies that the public policy at stake is strong indeed. In other
contexts, courts have invoked the public policy exception based on
conflict with the forum state's constitution. Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1961, is
illustrative.286 In that case the court refused to apply a Massachusetts
statute that capped damages for wrongful death. The court reasoned
that the cap conflicted with New York public policy as established by a
provision in the New York state constitution, dating back to 1894, which
provided that damages in an action "for injuries resulting in
death ... shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."287
The court in Kilberg emphasized that the constitutional policy
at issue was "strong, clear, and old."288 The same has been said by other
courts of the constitutional perpetuities bans. The Texas Supreme
Court, for example, has said that "[t]his constitutional provision
expresses one of the cardinal and basic principles of our system of
government. It ... constitutes a peremptory command of constitutional
law that must be relentlessly enforced."289 For a court to connect these
two strands of precedent, and hold that the constitutional perpetuities
284. Spinozziv. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
285. See supra Table 1.
286. 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961); see also Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262, 266-67 (N.D.
2001) (invoking state constitutional ban on gambling in refusal to enforce a contract to split
Canadian lottery winnings).
287. Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 528 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16 and N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art.
I, § 18).
288. Id.
289. Brooker v. Brooker, 106 S.W.2d 247, 254 (Tex. 1937); see also Franklin v. Armfield, 34
Tenn. (2 Sneed) 305, 353 (1854) ("paramount law of the land"); Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312,
314 (Tex. 1963) ("high public policy").
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bans represent a strong public policy that warrants a refusal to apply
another state's perpetual trust statute, would be a rather modest step.
What this means is that settling a perpetual trust in a state without a
constitutional ban, such as in Delaware or South Dakota, provides no
guarantee that the trust will be recognized as valid in the courts of the
nine states with such a ban.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perpetual trusts, an established feature of today's estate
planning firmament, are a multibillion-dollar business. Yet little-
noticed provisions in the constitutions of nine states, including five that
purport to allow perpetual (or effectively perpetual) trusts, proscribe
"perpetuities." The potential for these constitutional provisions to
disrupt perpetual trust practice is of significant import.
The various state constitutional bans on perpetuities, which are
closely linked as a matter of historical development, can be traced back
to the North Carolina Constitution, which provides: "Perpetuities and
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be
allowed."290 There is abundant evidence that, as used in these
provisions, the term "perpetuity" was meant to reference an unbarrable
entail, meaning a perpetual string of inalienable life estates, "in
whatever guise it appeared."291 But under the perpetual trust statutes,
including in five states in the teeth of these constitutional bans, a donor
can create a trust for the lifetime benefit of successive generations in
perpetuity, with no power in anyone to terminate the trust or change
the order of succession.
The historical sources support three overlapping functional
rationales for the constitutional bans: (1) ensuring marketable title, (2)
protecting against changed circumstances, and (3) avoiding
concentrations of wealth and power. The third rationale was paramount
for the framers of the bans, who worried about the kind of dynastic
concentration of wealth and political power that was associated with
English aristocracy. Yet both champions and critics of perpetual trusts,
which tellingly are marketed as "dynasty trusts," agree that their
primary purpose is concentration and protection of family wealth.
Because text, purpose, and history all suggest that the
constitutional proscriptions of perpetuities were meant to proscribe
entails, whether in form or in function, and because a perpetual trust
is in purpose and in function an equitable fee tail, we conclude that
290. See supra note 10.
291. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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recognition of perpetual trusts is prohibited in states with a
constitutional prohibition of perpetuities, but more modest reforms
such as reformation and wait-and-see are permissible. We also suggest
that the constitutional prohibitions reflect the kind of strong public
policy that would authorize a court in a state with such a provision to
refuse to apply another state's law authorizing perpetual trusts.
